# Daily Report

# East Europe

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*FBIS-EEU-96-049* *12 March 1996*

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**Bulgaria: Lilov Discusses Cabinet's Problems**

*AU1103142396 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 7-13 Mar 96 pp 10-14*

[Interview with Aleksandur Lilov, a member of the BSP Executive Bureau, by Teodora Encheva; place and date not given: "Aleksandur Lilov: I Will Be Harsh Toward Every BSP Member Involved in Oriongate"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Encheva] Mr. Lilov, could we please return to 2 January 1996, when you met the prime minister? Is it true that you then warned the prime minister that you would not participate in a second failure of a socialist government, and that if he did not correct his policy you would act independently?

[Lilov] Except for the last sentence in your question, which is both incorrect and biased, I must say that frankly, I am impressed with the correct information you have. You even amaze me with the literal precision of your question, because there were no witnesses to our conversation, not because it was secret, but because of its frank nature. It was more than a political conversation. It was benevolent and even friendly.

I really do not have the political or moral possibility to participate in something that again would destroy the voters' faith in the leftist forces. I think that now the problem is to show responsibility to our voters. If we retreat, this will show that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is not ready to govern Bulgaria under the new conditions. If this happens, the voters will justly punish the BSP. However, I think that the BSP has the possibility of implementing its commitments. We talked at length about translating this possibility into action in 1996. I must say that we were unanimous. I will do everything to facilitate the success of our government. However, no one should doubt even for a moment that I could remain isolated or idle if we begin to deviate from the policy on the basis of which we won the elections, or fail in its practical implementation.

[Encheva] How did the prime minister react to the conversation?

[Lilov] I repeat, this was a very active conversation on both parts. The atmosphere was very good. I did not notice any principled or tactical differences.

[Encheva] Am I to understand that you are optimistic?

[Lilov] On 2 January I was, by all means. Now, in March, I begin to be concerned that we are losing time and pace. Nevertheless, I look forward to the plenum with great interest. In this context, I would like to begin the second year of our rule with a serious and official assessment on the part of the party and the parliamentary faction. They must not only satisfy public opinion, but also issue certain guarantees. I think that if we fail to create an atmosphere of benevolent and constructive criticism at the plenum, the party will not agree to become hostage to a practice that will put the confidence of the voters to the test.

[Encheva] Are you predicting that the BSP will topple its own government through the internal opposition?

[Lilov] We must consolidate around the practical action program for 1996. However, if changes in the strength and efficiency of our government really do not emerge, the development of an internal opposition is inevitable. This is so because the correcting mechanism of our party's rule is not only in the hands of the public, but within the party itself. The form in which this correcting mechanism will act is open—it could be an internal opposition, or any other form. This is not the most important thing in this case. The important thing is to prevent another crisis in the confidence in the party. If we nevertheless allow this, we will be disqualified from governing the country for a long period of time.

[Encheva] Are you satisfied with the fact that five years ago you designated Zhan Videnov your heir in the BSP leadership?

[Lilov] Do not expect from me any sensational statement or cardinal assessment. Be patient. Time measures the value of every deed. The very step of rejuvenating the party leadership and giving a green light to the new generation was correct in principle for the conditions that existed then. I think that representatives of all generations will continue to be represented in the leading BSP organs, but the basic weight must be carried by those born in the new age. Thus I see no reason to regret my principled decision. I hope to have no personal disappointments. I do not envisage any success for those who plan a generation of infighting in the BSP. This would be madness for the party and an early political death for the initiators. [passage omitted]

[Encheva] Do you think that Zhan Videnov succumbs to private interests?

[Lilov] Please, you are so young, why are you trying to be so insidious? I do not have the impression that Zhan wants to amend the party's policy, and I have no proof that he depends on this or that group, something that you imply in your question. Do you mean Orion?

[Encheva] Yes, for example.

[Lilov] When any evidence related to the so-called Oriongate appears, I will be the first ally of those who demand a harsh attitude toward the culprits. This is all I have to say for now. [passage omitted]

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[Encheva] Mr. Lilov, there is not a single BSP member who publicly admits that he has any evidence about Oriongate. On the other hand, there already are BSP members who are saying that Zhan Videnov will be the first Bulgarian prime minister to be arrested for corruption, more specifically because of the Orion group. Could you comment on this matter?

[Lilov] Well, I am not interested in what the people are saying. I am interested in the facts. I know that scandals throughout the world—in Japan, Italy, and the United States—are something almost natural today. I also know that scandals could destroy anyone as a politician and place him in a very difficult position as a citizen. I also know that scandals are staged sometimes. Therefore, I demand facts and only facts. If I obtain the facts, my attitude will be extremely negative and politically harsh, regardless of who the person involved in the matter is. [passage omitted]

[Encheva] Mr. Lilov, do you not feel yourself responsible for Bulgaria's failures in the last five years? Many people consider you the ideologist of confrontation.

[Lilov] Of course, everyone is free to make his assessment. However, I issued the appeal to assume the Spanish political model already in 1990. I did this from the Grand National Assembly rostrum. This also was my policy as the BSP leader. I cannot be the ideologist of confrontation. Others are the ideologists of confrontation. I could rather be described as the failed ideologist of reconciliation and national unity. [passage omitted]

**Bulgaria: Purvanov on Possible Cabinet Shuffle**

*AU1103152996 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 7 Mar 96 pp 12-13*

[Interview with Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, by Neda Popova; place and date not given: "I Expect the BSP Plenum To Instruct the Prime Minister To Make Specific Cabinet Changes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popova] Mr. Purvanov, it is well known that in its initial stand on the forthcoming BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] plenum the BSP Ideological Development Commission that you chair recommended to Zhan Videnov not to expand the coalition cabinet any further. Could you shed some light on this thesis?

[Purvanov] The coalition cabinet has a role to play at certain stages of development, and I consider that this formula has justified its existence to some extent in past years. Today, however, especially under the conditions in which the party and its coalition partners have won such an overwhelming majority, it would not be a good thing to return to formulas that have already exhausted their potential, such as cabinets of experts, supraparty governments, or a broad coalition cabinet.

In a certain sense, our government is also a coalition one. However, no evasion of responsibilities is permissible today. I say this, but at the same time wish to stress that this does not release the BSP from the need to work to achieve a broad national consensus and to attract other political forces and formations into playing a part in the policies of the Democratic Left's ruling coalition. I mean drawing them into various forms of commitment.

[Popova] On the evening of 4 March, I saw with my own eyes Minister Mimi Vitkova enter the BSP headquarters building, and immediately afterwards a report leaked out that after meeting Prime Minister Videnov she had submitted her resignation. Tell us what really happened.

[Purvanov] I did not attend this meeting, because I was in Serbia. However, the policies of the individual ministries will be carefully analyzed at the 10 March plenum on the government's term in office, and on this basis substantive recommendations on changes will no doubt be made. However, for the time being at least, no one in the BSP would venture ahead of the plenum to state a categorical view on the adjustments needed.

[Popova] Nevertheless, anywhere else in the world, in the event of such a major blunder—I mean the AIDS scandal—the relevant minister would automatically tender his or her resignation, since it is not so much a matter of direct blame as of moral responsibility....

[Purvanov] I regard Minister Vitkova as one of the most stable ministers; she is a person with inexhaustible energy, honest to the core, and I believe that the cabinet benefits from having people like her in its team.

[Popova] What about people like Rumen Gechev?

[Purvanov] Rumen Gechev is a highly trained specialist. However, I cannot make final assessments, because I am not familiar with his work within the government.

[Popova] Do you expect demands for individual ministers' resignations to be made at the 10 March plenum? How true is the assertion that an innerparty opposition group exists that will demand the heads of the five or six ministers who have repeatedly been mentioned not only by the media, but also by Socialists?

[Purvanov] Specific names will no doubt be mentioned in the debating hall. However, it is difficult to say whether they will be included in the plenum's final resolution. It is more likely that the plenum will agree on a standpoint and, on the basis of the debates and the relevant resolution, direct the prime minister to make the necessary adjustments.

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**Czech Republic: Article Urges Role in NATO for Russia**

*AU1203112596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 9 Mar 96 p 12*

[Article by Lubos Palata: "It Is Necessary To Offer Russia the Possibility of Participation in NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The interest of the Czech Republic and the other states of Central and East Europe in joining the North Atlantic Alliance is still coming up against a barrage of objections from Russia. Although it is clear that Moscow must not dictate to either us or the alliance whether, when, and by whom NATO will be enlarged, it is in our interest to take as much edge as possible off Russian resistance and, conceivably, to change the view of at least part of the local political scene and public of this act. Anyway, it is worth reflecting that, in today's Russia, there is not one influential political force that would not be opposed to the alliance's enlargement toward the East. To explain this by saying that there are no longer any democrats in Moscow is passing the buck too much.

As the representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance are also proclaiming, the admission of new members is today not a technical but a political issue, and, apart from the hesitancy of some Western statesmen, a primary role is played in it by the attempt to antagonize Russia by means of this step.

More than a year ago, Moscow came up with a proposal to establish a Pan-European security system that would subordinate NATO to a kind of continental United Nations that would emerge from the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. It is necessary to reject unequivocally this idea, which, moreover, has never been properly concretized by the Russian side. One reason, among others, is the minimal effectiveness of the OSCE, which has demonstrated adequately in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus its inability to resolve conflicts.

An option that it would be possible to consider is a Pan-European structure in which NATO would not be subordinate to but be placed above some kind of more general framework for security cooperation. The Partnership for Peace could be the basis for this system, and, to a certain extent, the international IFOR [Implementation Force] operation in Bosnia is its touchstone.

A place is reserved for Russia in the Partnership and IFOR that corresponds not only to its current status, but also to a possible future ideal state. At the same time, the two processes remain under the thorough supervision and leadership of NATO, which, in principle, guarantees their success.

Therefore, it should now be made clear to Moscow that the alliance and the applicants for membership in it are taking the Russians into consideration in their plans for the future as an ally and even as a key ally. As long as Russia does not stray from the path of democracy and the observation of human rights, or, to put it better, as long as it returns to it, it should also be offered participation in the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance, albeit to a limited but exclusive extent. Not even Moscow's membership in a transformed form of NATO and in a position that would correspond approximately to the current role of the United States should be ruled out fundamentally. Here we Central Europeans have to extricate ourselves from our Soviet complex and not identify Russia with the USSR in the future if we really do not have cogent reasons for this.

At the same time, however, it is necessary to state clearly that this consideration concerns not present-day Russia but a genuinely democratic and pro-Western-oriented Russia, and to emphasize that the current reality of this Eurasian power in key areas is essentially far from this situation. Despite this, or for this very reason, it is necessary to give Moscow a guarantee now that, if it sets out in this direction, it will find an open door at the end of the long tunnel.

That is, if we view the current and future role of NATO as the defender of democracy and the values of European civilization, then maybe sometime in the future a democratic and stable Russia will be not only a natural but also a necessary ally without which Europe will be an overlooked peninsula on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.

We should not forget, in our continental self-centeredness, that the current balance between the pro-European and non-European area of civilization is diverging sharply to our disadvantage because of, among other things, the economic and security collapse in Russia. Despite all of its obvious shortcomings, today's Moscow is closer to Europe than many Asian countries that pretend to be democratic. Motivating Russia to continue along the path it has embarked upon—and today already partially abandoned—toward the West is a serious task that can only be relinquished in the event of absolutely hopeless development in Moscow.

Therefore, it is necessary to offer Russia a place, if not in Europe, then at least by its side. Only this will be able to convince some Russian politicians that the alliance's enlargement is not directed against the interests of their

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country, but is, on the contrary, in its interest. The West has been looking intensively for this method for at least a year. It is our duty to take part in this search, because, at all events, this is also happening because of our wish to enter into the alliance in the very foreseeable future.

**Czech Republic: Klaus Expatiates on Yugoslav Visit**

*AU1203114396 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 8 Mar 96 p 3*

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Tomas Chalupa; place and date not given: "The Past Is Still Blocking Fast and Sensible Solutions"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Chalupa] You returned from a visit to two former Yugoslav republics on Tuesday [5 March]. One of them is the present-day new Yugoslavia, which is often described as one of the main culprits in what has taken place in this region in recent months. Has your visit somehow altered your view on this issue?

[Klaus] I have to admit that this visit has in no way altered my view on most of the culprits and most of the reasons for the whole problem. If I have taken away something new, it is rather a certain disappointment that the politicians of this region are still trying to win past conflicts. I endeavored utterly in vain to explain to them that the past cannot be won, that only the future can be won. I have the feeling that the unresolved issues of the past are so extremely extant in this region that even their evaluation is so important that they block any sensible fast solutions. In my opinion, this is erroneous, but it is not up to me to criticize it. During the visit, we encountered a great response to our participation in the IFOR [Implementation Force] international units. I have to say that it was highly praised on all sides.

[Chalupa] Our disagreements with Russia on the NATO enlargement issue persist. Do you think Russian politicians are capable now and also in the future of listening to sensible arguments on this issue and that there could be a change in their current attitudes?

[Klaus] Politics is about talking, arguing, and convincing the other side. This concerns all topics, and, of course, it also concerns the topic of NATO enlargement. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] Reports have appeared in some of the media that, at the beginning of January, the Civic Democratic Party tried to make a change in the defense minister's post. The whole dispute was apparently only resolved at a secret meeting between you and People's Party Chairman Josef Lux. Is this true?

[Klaus] I always have to smile at the constant attempts to interpret the world by means of plots and conspiracies. Simply, if, following a government session, the prime minister speaks with the deputy prime minister, the adjective "secret" is applied to this meeting. At the same time, in my opinion, this involves one of the most natural activities of all people in the world, and I see no secrecy in this. It is undoubtedly true that we also discussed this issue, and, quite logically, Minister Holan's name also came up. In no way, however, did our conversation concern any immediate departure of Mr. Holan from his post as defense minister.

**Czech Republic: Anti-Chinese Rally Marks Tibet Anniversary**

*LD1103184696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] There was a demonstration in front of the Chinese Embassy in Prague today. Pavla Dluhosova reports:

[Dluhosova] The rally started with a speech by Simon Panek from the People in Need [Clovek v Tisni] Foundation, which organized the event to express its fundamental disapproval of the policy carried out by the Chinese leadership in Tibet.

[begin Panek recording] We protest above all against the long-term and mass violation of human rights committed in Tibet by the state, military, and police administration, imposed in the wake of the occupation [word indistinct] and increased following the mass display of dissatisfaction by the Tibetans. [end recording]

[Dluhosova] This was also the opening sentence of a protest letter the demonstrators unsuccessfully tried to hand to the Chinese ambassador. The press spokeswoman for the embassy came out of the embassy to face the demonstrators, but she rejected their protest as groundless and refused to accept the letter. The 200 mostly young people who participated in the rally stayed in front of the embassy for another half-hour shouting slogans. They are now dispersing. The event was attended by a number of Czech cultural figures, including writers Ludvik Vaculik and Alexandra Berkova. [passage omitted]

The press department of the Czech Foreign Ministry stressed today that the Czech Republic is in favor of China's indivisibility, but, at the same time, the ministry is not prepared to intervene in the local government sphere. In this way, the Foreign Ministry is reacting to the fact that the Hradec Kralove town hall and the Zizkov district town hall in Prague are currently flying the Tibetan flag to mark the 37th anniversary of the anti-Chinese uprising in Lhasa.

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**Czech Republic: Army To Buy Fighters 'Jointly' With Poland**

*AU1203095696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 9 Mar 96 p 2*

[Report by "(gag)": "The Czech Army Apparently Will Purchase New Fighter Aircraft Jointly With Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague/Warsaw—The Czech Republic and Poland will apparently jointly purchase Western fighters for their Armies. The U.S. F-16 aircraft is at the forefront of the two countries' interest, followed closely by the Swedish JAS-35 Gripen.

The spokesman for the Polish Defense Ministry, Eugeniusz Mleczak, said that the joint purchase of the same type of Western aircraft is advocated in particular by the anticipated close cooperation between the Czech and Polish Armies, if they are admitted to NATO.

Mleczak also confirmed that the recent visit to Warsaw by Jiri Nekvasil, chief of the General Staff of the Czech Army, who held talks there with his counterpart, Tadeusz Wilecki, gave a considerable boost to the hitherto rapport. He also conceded that the French Mirage 2000 figures among the proposals that have not yet been dropped completely from the game. On the other hand, the Soviet [as published] recommendation of the modernized MiG-29M or the successful Su-27 has, according to the spokesman, less of a chance.

Defense Ministers Vilem Holan and Stanislaw Dobrzanski also held talks in Prague yesterday on scientific-technical cooperation. At the same time, the Polish minister acknowledged that his country, like the Czech Republic is faced with the purchase of a multipurpose supersonic aircraft. "We are still deciding which type is the most suitable; therefore, we are holding consultations with the Czech Army," said Dobrzanski. According to him, the two countries have obtained submissions not only from the United States.

Holan confirmed his earlier statement that he will exert a great deal of effort to make sure that the government discusses as soon as possible the study by the Czech-U.S. commission in which the experts put forward four possible options for modernizing the Air Forces. "The government has to decide judiciously and quickly," said Holan, who described the situation in the Air Force as very serious and complicated.

Colonel Frantisek Padelek, deputy Air Force inspector, has even said that technical problems could influence the Czech Air Force's participation in the international CIAF-96 show in Hradec Kralove, in which the air forces of the majority of European countries will take part. "The overall preparation of our pilots has, under certain circumstances, a higher priority that the preparation of a few ace pilots for the air show," claims Padelek.

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**Slovakia: Tothova Disagrees With State Department Report**

*AU1103171996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Mar 96 p 1*

[Report by "sp": "Katarina Tothova Disagrees With U.S. Report Noting Deviation From Democracy in Slovak Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The assessment is not based on the real situation in the Slovak Republic. It will be necessary to enter into communication with the appropriate experts for them to come and convince themselves about the real situation. This was stated by Deputy Prime Minister Tothova in reply to the question about her assessment of the human rights report published by the U.S. State Department. The report notes, among other things, deviation from democratic principals in the Slovak Republic and enumerates contradictory phenomena of our domestic political developments last year. According to Katarina Tothova, "[to speak about] lack of press freedom is absolute nonsense. Interventions in public communications media are unwarranted. The Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting is not subordinated to the government, but it is a body elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], a fact being forgotten abroad. It was precisely Meciar's government that canceled a resolution of Jozef Moravcik's government providing for the Council's transformation into a central body of state administration, which would imply its direct subordination to the government." Similarly, Bartolomej Kunc, NRSR deputy for the Slovak National Party, perceives the U.S. State Department report as the statement by observers from far away who do not view developments in our country closely. "I would not overestimate this report, because I have not read it, and I would not make any calvary out of it," Robert Fico, deputy to the NRSR for the Party of the Democratic Left, told SME. In his opinion, the Slovak Republic does not rank among countries having problems with the protection of human rights. Asked whether the opposition might be blamed by the coalition for the consequences of the report, Jan Figel, member of the NRSR Foreign Affairs Committee for the Christian Democratic Movement, said: "He who has power is responsible for its enforcement. The opposition is virtually unable to halt the legislative process. Those who claim that the opposition is responsible for information [about Slovakia] abroad are using a false argument. Foreign embassies possess very good analyses of the situation in Slovakia. Responsibility for the image of the Slovak Republic is borne by those who wield power."

**Slovakia: U.S. Report, Government Daily's Reaction Viewed**

*AU1103175596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Mar 96 p 4*

[Commentary by Lubomir Lintner: "You With Rose-Colored Glasses, Get Down From That Tree!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The printing ink on the report on U.S. State Department experts' assessment of the state of human rights in Slovakia was not even dry when Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Deputy [and SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA chief editor] Jan Smolec hoisted the patriotic flag: "Ladies and gentlemen of Slovakia! The experts of the U.S. State Department took a substantial part of their information from only one source, an opposition daily." I hope that Deputy Smolec, whose opinion on the work of U.S. foreign policy experts is just another indication of the standard of thinking in a certain part of the Slovak political spectrum, will provoke Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk to explain to him how the U.S. State Department gathers its information. During his New Year's reception of journalists, I asked Juraj Schenk how many times he had asked Vladimir Meciar that the attacks on the president and the challenging of the mandates of Democratic Union deputies be discontinued, because these two factors served as a basis for the democratic West's objections (demarches) to developments in Slovakia. Juraj Schenk avoided (out of loyalty) a direct reply, but it was possible to infer from his words that he had done so more than once. The latest report of the U.S. State Department notes that trends of deflection from democracy exist in Slovakia and, further on, it only enumerates actually realized and existing facts. No more and no less. Deputy Smolec's appeal to fellow Slovaks about another wrong inflicted upon Slovakia may assuage his internal passions, but his attitude (and similar offended reactions that can be expected also from the government camp) only supports the tendency to see things through rose-colored glasses. It is an undeniable truth that the direction of developments after the fall 1994 elections was set by Vladimir Meciar when he raised personal revenge to the status of domestic political strategy. No macroeconomic indicators can obliterate this fact. The result are facts as monitored by the U.S. State Department in its report. My dear, if you do not get down from that tree, you will only be damaging Slovakia!

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**Slovakia: Poll: 44% Support Sending Troops to E. Slavonia**

*AU0803161996 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 7 Mar 96 p 2*

[Report by TASR: "Soldiers' Peacekeeping Mission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—More than two-fifths (44 percent) of 1,236 respondents questioned by the Institute for Public Opinion Research operating under the Slovak Statistical Office approve of Slovak soldiers' participation in the peacekeeping mission in East Slavonia, 28 percent disapprove, and 28 percent of those polled answered that they were unable to assess this issue.

**Slovakia: Meciar on Screening Law, UN Ambassador**

*LD0803220096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1738 GMT 8 Mar 96*

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Michal Tvarozek; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tvarozek] Prime Minister, a discussion about the screening law and its observance has started again. Are changes to the law being considered? Is it being observed or is it now outdated? [passage omitted]

[Meciar] I have always spoken out against the adoption of the screening law. I am also opposed to its abuses. I am opposed to something what I have personally experienced—to the falsification and fabrication of documents. I have never cooperated with the communist secret police [StB]. They just used to be interested in me as an enemy of socialism and look at the rumors arising from that. This is my personal experience and thus I am asking how many other people might be abused in this way?

I also have to face the fact that documents are in another state. And the StB headquarters used to be in another state. We cannot be sure whether we have received all documents or not. We only know what we have received. Is it then in the security interests of our state to open a possibility of people in our country being blackmailed?

The screening law is in force. No decision has been taken on the body which should implement it. We have agreed that the law will automatically expire at the end of this year. Its extension is not being considered.

If the National Council decides on the body to implement it, it will be implemented. However, I personally will oppose on principle any further extension of its validity and will support any initiative to repeal this law in Slovakia. [passage omitted]

[Tvarozek] The president has failed to sign a proposal to appoint Labor Minister Olga Keltosova as Slovak ambassador to the UN. What steps will the government now take in this matter, Prime Minister? [passage omitted]

[Meciar] As it is its right, the government has put forward a candidate on whose professional and personal suitability the president has not cast any doubt. This means the proposal was a good one.

In choosing the candidate, the government was mindful that Slovakia has a realistic chance of chairing the UN General Assembly in 1997, which is undoubtedly a historic and political success. Furthermore, the government had to take into consideration the fact that the candidate proposed by the government enjoys such status and authority in international circles that she was the first Slovak woman to address a UN plenary session. Hence, the chances of her succeeding in this candidacy were great. That is over and done with and is not to be. The president has made this decision and he must bear the responsibility.

Second, you have situations when the president assumes the position of saying the state and me. This is not true. The state consists of all of us. Each of us is a servant of this state regardless of one's post.

Looking at it from this point of view, we see the president, who is a constitutional body of the state, refusing to appoint a member of the government because a resolution expressing vote of no confidence in the president has been adopted by the government as a whole. In this situation, the president asks a member of the government to dissociate herself from her previous views. This minister is a constitutional official, she is serving the state and is to be transferred to another post. However, in this context she is submitted to the pressure which literally equals blackmail and demoralization. [Words indistinct]

As regards people in this country, how do we assess their relations and values? Is the same meter being applied to all, or are some people more likely to be described as being "one of us" than others, and some less so?

I think that the government will react to this. It is not an intervention which harms the government, it is not a matter of our prestige. This intervention has harmed an important state and political interest of the Slovak Republic—its effort to chair the UN. This is taking place in the situation when it is clear that the chair will be assumed by one of the Central European countries, the

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one which will gain the greatest authority in the UN—and Minister Keltosova was in such a position.

As regards the internal situation in our state, I am glad that I will keep the minister with whom I have cooperated well. Everything in papers are lies. Those who wrote it, bear the responsibility for it. [passage omitted]

What I am saying here is my personal view. The government has acknowledged what happened but has not yet reacted. It will certainly do so. The other reason why I am sad about what happened is that the president has sent me a letter inviting me for a meeting to discuss the relations between us two. [passage omitted]

[Tvarozek] Are you, as the government, going to insist that the ambassador must be Mrs. Keltosova or are you going to try to find another candidate?

[Meciar] We have no other candidate and this is why there is unfortunately nothing left for us to discuss.

**Slovakia: Minister Defends Controversial Language Law**

*LD1103143996 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 1130 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] In Slovakia, a much debated language law decreed that Slovak is the country's only official language. That law is sharply criticized by the large Hungarian minority in Slovakia. This is how the Slovak minister of culture is defending the controversial language law to our correspondent Kjell Albin Abrahamson in Bratislava:

[Abrahamson] The minister said: I find it hard to imagine any other country where 10 percent of the conscripts do not understand the language of command or, in the event of a natural disaster, one-tenth of the population does not understand the warnings that the authorities are issuing.

Slovak Culture Minister Ivan Hudec, the architect of the new language law, presents clear and drastic examples to defend the new law which has made Slovak the only official state language.

The law was approved by parliament with a broad majority—108 deputies out of 144 voted for the law. The country's Hungarian minority of 600,000 people maintain, however, that the law is discriminatory, but Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the foreign affairs committee, thinks that the Hungarian minority are ungrateful and only demand more and more. Schools, universities, newspapers, and theaters in Hungarian are a reality in Slovakia. The Slovak minority in Hungary, on the other nand, have no such rights, he says. Slovakia can be confronted with all European countries and all the rights existing here do not exist in other countries, Dusan Slobodnik says.

Peter Weiss, leader of the opposition party, the Party of the Democratic Left, thinks that as far as the language issue is concerned, Slovakia is in a legal vacuum. The problem is not the Slovak language as the official state language, Weiss says. The problem is that a new law was not drafted in parallel on how the minority languages may be used in official contexts. We are in a legal vacuum and the new minority language law will not be completed until the end of the year, says opposition politician Peter Weiss. He is well aware that both Brussels and Strasbourg are closely following developments in Slovakia.

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**Hungary: Parliamentary Deputy Groups Elect Leaders**

*LD1103141996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The MDF's [Hungarian Democratic Forum] parliamentary deputy group has shrunk further. Laszlo Salamon announced that he will join the independent deputies, and thus it is expected that he will also leave the post of deputy speaker of parliament.

In the meantime, the MDF's parliamentary group elected Ervin Demeter as chairman, since Ivan Szabo's departure left the post vacant. At the same time, the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP], which was formed by former MDF members, elected Ivan Szabo as parliamentary group leader. He held the same post in the MDF, but resigned after losing the MDF chairman election to Sandor Lezsak a week ago. Deputy Attila Zsigmond confirmed to Kossuth radio that the court registered the Hungarian Democratic People's Party, which was in dispute with the Christian Democratic People's Party over the choice of name. The necessary [number of] 15 deputies officially announced their entry into the MDNP parliamentary group.

**Hungary: Rally Against Terrorism, Extreme Right**

*LD1003131496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 10 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] A demonstration is being held in Budapest against the revival of terrorism and the rising popularity of extreme right ideologies. Our reporter estimates that at the Holocaust Memorial on the Ujpest Quay, there are about 2,000 to 3,000 people protesting not only against the Hamas terrorist actions in Israel, but also against the movement of Albert Szabo, who is renowned for his extremist views and who was acquitted a few days ago. Levente Sukosd reports from the scene.

[Sukosd] Two years ago, on the 50th anniversary of the Holocaust, the victims of the mass murderers were commemorated here at the call of the Zionist community of Hungary and the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary. Now a crowd of a couple thousand are commemorating the Israeli citizens who were atrociously murdered a few days ago. They are also protesting the revival of terrorism.

At the commemoration, the organizers note that there are things to protest in Hungary too. An ideology, in the name of which hundreds were shot in the Danube and millions were destroyed in Auschwitz and other places, is being revived under our nose and virtually within a legal framework. The warning was prompted by the recent acquittal of Albert Szabo, who is known for his extremist views.

**Hungary: Environmentalist Views Fuel Rod Delivery**

*AU1103215496 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 8 Mar 96 p 8*

[Interview with Gyorgy Droppa, cochairman of the Green Alternative, by Istvan Palugyai; place and date not given: "We Request Public Information"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has to be accepted that some citizens—the Green Alternative represents these people—oppose nuclear energy. However, we reject extreme views. We are not saying that the Paks nuclear power station should be closed down immediately. We would like all Europe to be completely nuclear free by 2010, Gyorgy Droppa, cochairman of the environmentalist party says. He has also raised his voice in the issue of the fuel rods coming from Germany.

[Palugyai] Up to now, you have been the constructive domestic opposition of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, if one can put it this way. Is it possible that your views will become radicalized in the wake of the Greenpeace's action?

[Droppa] In my view, no extremism exists in the opinion of our representatives. In accordance with the guidelines of the federation of European green parties, all we want is for nuclear energy to disappear from the continent by 2010. The Paks power station should also be closed down, gradually, by this time, in such a way that the oldest reactor bloc would be taken out of service in 2003. We have to continue to work together with Paks to achieve this goal. We have also been to the Pecs uranium mine to help the recultivation of waste stockpiles which form radiating hillsides and are harmful to health. We started from the premise that the decision of the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments to ban the transit of used fuel rods was completely justified although disadvantageous for us. Therefore, we have to coexist with these materials for a while and their storage in Hungary has to be solved. It was precisely at the Green Alternative's suggestion that the Turin General Assembly of the Federation of Environmentalist Parties passed a resolution according to which every country has to provide for the storage of its own nuclear waste. Therefore, we are not at all acting irresponsibly in solving this issue. However, our opinion on an experiment which has never been conducted before is completely different.

[Palugyai] Why did you feel this fuel rod delivery to be more dangerous than the previous ones?

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[Droppa] Experts at the session of the parliamentary environmental protection committee said to our question that, in their view, too, the transport of this type of partially burned fuel is more dangerous than the transport of completely new fuel, although it undoubtedly means less threat than the completely used up fuel rods which are highly active waste. However, we see the transport and reuse of these fuel rods which have been tempered with as an experiment. And we are particularly unhappy about the fact that this experiment has first been done in Hungary.

[Palugyai] Many people ask why Greenpeace's action was necessary for the Hungarian greens to suddenly question Paks's safety?

[Droppa] The whole Greifswald issue was illuminating for us because some new information we had not known came to light in the wake of Paks presenting its defense. It turned out that there is a formerly unpublished 1996 report according to which Paks is not so safe after all. It has come to light that Paks has only been publishing the documents which paint a positive picture of it.

[Palugyai] What has been made public of this report?

[Droppa] I have not seen this report, but I know that the Greenpeace's representative referred to it and I saw how embarrassed the power station's director was when he reacted to this. At any rate, it is difficult to have confidence in people who conceal important facts. We cannot be criticized when, as a kind of social conscience, we do our work by questioning them about publicity. We maintain that people who might not have professional knowledge also have a say in these kinds of issues. Politicians, including parliamentary deputies, do not have nuclear physics knowledge but they bring their decisions after listening to expert opinion. We do the same, referring to the articles and statements of nuclear physicists which we actually find debatable.

[Palugyai] Why was protest against fuel rods delivered precisely to Paks in Greenpeace's interest, when much less modern reactors also exist in Eastern Europe?

[Droppa] First of all, Greenpeace deals with nuclear energy issues and, second, the fuel rods were set off to Hungary, rather than to Bulgaria or Slovakia, from Greifswald, where the German member organization is at home. As a matter of fact, Greenpeace has also acted against the power station being built in Mochovce [Slovakia].

[Palugyai] Did it not seem as if a belittling and despising attitude not uncommon in the West in connection with Eastern matters had also been part of the whole issue and, in the given case, this had also been applied to the technology, expertise, and safety regulations in Paks?

[Droppa] Indeed, I often sense such opinions. At the same time, I do not have any information on Hungarian technical culture being a major seller on the nuclear energy market and its patents being bought all over the world. The often quoted data of the Paks power station, namely that the reactors are among the world's first 25 such reactors, are indicators of capacity utilization, rather than safety, and in my view they only have a very distant relationship with safety. Therefore, describing this list as a safety ranking list can mislead the public. We, as always, are in favor of open and correct information for the public in this issue, too.

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**B-H: 'Deep Split' Said Opening Between EU, U.S.**

*BR1103140396 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 11 Mar 96 p 5*

[Article by Xavier Vidal-Folch: "Split Between the United States and the EU Over Reconstruction of Former Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Palermo—A deep split is opening up between Europe and the United States over the future of the former Yugoslavia. The EU foreign ministers' irritation at their Atlantic allies—despite being understated—was palpable yesterday at the informal council meeting. The differences of opinion are multiplying on all fronts: be it money for reconstruction, the rearming of the Bosnians, or the timetable for the NATO peace force (IFOR).

In public, Susanna Agneli, Italian foreign minister and president-in-office, merely reiterated that the IFOR allied forces' withdrawal "was to be undertaken jointly." At the meeting, others were more open about Washington's hinted-at hurry to end the mission: "We arrived together and we will leave together," various people said. The only issue on which there was a glimmer of consensus was the recent agreement to the effect that NATO troops could extend their military mandate to carry out civilian operations. But it was like pulling teeth to get that out of the United States.

The second bone of contention was more dangerous. Washington has called a conference on equipment and training in Ankara on 15 March. European diplomats think that Washington's aim is to rearm the Bosnians. That would lead to an arms race, reviving the rhetoric of strength and guns and burying the peace. For this reason, the European diplomats have decided not to attend. The Dayton agreement is sick and the split is currently taking precedence over attempts to coordinate the new states, said mediator Carl Bildt to the ministers, but not to the general public. "It would be better if the United States invested its money in reconstruction and not in arms," one of the Fifteen moralized, despite the hope that Washington's rhetoric is aimed solely at the upcoming election.

The money for reconstruction marks the zenith of the simmering confrontation (nobody will air it in all its harshness) between Europe and the United States. The Fifteen decided yesterday to take the plunge and propose that the Conference of Donors be held on 12 and 13 April to earmark the $5 billion urgently needed. The EU suggested distributing this money in three parts on a pro rata basis from the EU, the United States, and a group comprising Japan, the Gulf states, and other countries. But Washington still rejects this. It only wants to cough up $200 million of the purse by scaling down its major military effort. That military effort "is similar to ours," grumble its partners.

**Failure Predicted**

The meeting "must be a success," said the tireless [European Commission President] Jacques Santer hopefully—concealing a predicted failure. In fact, the ministers discussed two alternatives: either postpone the meeting until the United States and the others increase their share, or hold the meeting now at the risk of getting landed with the bulk of the spending.

They opted for the second alternative, "because we cannot wait any longer" if we want to maintain the credibility of the peace process, Spanish [Foreign Minister] Carlos Westendorp said. This means that the Fifteen will commit themselves, in the hope of dragging along their partners and making them "face up to their responsibilities." There is a positive sign but it comes from the East and is unofficial: At the recent Bangkok summit Japan hinted that it could shoulder 10 percent of the cost. Some $1.2 billion is needed for this year's projects, Santer reported. At the end of the day, everything seems to indicate that instead of the hoped-for multiyear "mini-Marshall Plan" package that would serve as an economic inducement for peace, the West will contribute the same amount, but in "year-by-year" commitments. In other words, the economic aspect will continue to be devoid of its political incentive dimension. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Muratovic Briefs Press on Reconstruction Conference**

*AU1203071296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[Report by Miralem Kruskic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kruskic] At the beginning of today's press conference, Mr. Muratovic said: The success of the Dayton agreement is closely linked to the successful implementation and speedy realization of the promised donations for reconstruction. This will lead to a speedier economic recovery of the country, and thus create employment possibilities for all, refugees, returnees, and demobilized members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Armed Forces. Taking all this into account, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, with the support of the EC and the World Bank, and with the participation of the High Commissioner's Office, has taken the initiative for organizing an informative conference on the program of reconstruction in Bosnia that will be held at the Holiday Inn Hotel in Sarajevo on 16 and 17 March.

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[Muratovic] A total of 58 countries have been invited to participate in the conference. So far, over 40 countries have confirmed their arrival. The conference will primarily focus on the issue of damage resulting from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by our long-term and most important requirements in particular sectors of the infrastructure and the economy in general. After this, we will propose the priorities as we see them, globally for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for particular sectors, and finally, we shall present our view of investment opportunities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I wish to tell you that there is a rumor that the conference, scheduled for 12 and 13 April in Brussels, will be postponed. In fact, some countries have proposed this postponement. This is completely unacceptable for us; the conference has already been postponed from February to March, and from March to April. As you know, the realization of donations agreed on at the first conference is progressing very slowly, and a further postponement of the conference would take us well into summer, which means that we would waste an entire season. In this respect, we appeal and shall appeal at this informative conference to all countries, future donors, to resist such ideas. I wish to inform you that we have also invited representatives of the Serb entity to participate in the conference. For the time being, we have not received [words indistinct], but if they come, they will participate as part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation.

[Kruskic] As far as Islamic countries are concerned, Mr. Muratovic said:

[Muratovic] As far as Islamic countries, whose donation in terms of the sum of the contribution has been questioned by many western countries, are concerned, I wish to inform you that the Islamic countries have been invited to the conference, and that some of them have already confirmed their participation, but I also wish to say that we have organized, at a much higher level, a meeting with [words indistinct] most probably during the last week of this month [words indistinct].

[Kruskic] At the end of his address, republican Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic stressed that this was the first international conference of this size in Bosnia-Herzegovina since its recognition.

**B-H: Abdic Claims Wide Support, Predicts Election Victory**

*AU0903211096 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 7 Mar 96 p 2*

[Report by "S.R.": "Babo Is Replacing Alija"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 6 Mar—Fikret Abdic, who is currently living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is announcing a triumphant return to the political scene in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. He claims that Alija Izetbegovic will remain in the presidential chair a few more months—or to be more precise, until the announcement of the election results. In its night program, in which Abdic appeared as a guest, Croat radio of Herzeg-Bosnia stated that Babo [Abdic's nickname] of Velika Kladusa enjoys great support in the Tuzla and Zenica Cantons (regions). This is also confirmed by the fact that Abdic's newly founded party, the People's Democratic Community, which was registered in Mostar in mid-February, has already secured the support of nearly 6,000 people in Tuzla and approximately 5,000 in Zenica.

"In the first multiparty elections for president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I received as much as 30 percent more votes than Alija Izetbegovic, to whom I subsequently relinquished power, as power does not essentially interest me. I am a businessman and I am only interested in work and the prosperity of the environment in which I work. However, this time I will certainly not repeat the mistake of letting someone else sit in the presidential chair."

**B-H: Details of Equip, Train Program for Federal Army**

*LD0803233896 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 8 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The realization of an equip and train project for the Bosnia-Herzegovina federal army requires $800 million. The United States itself will provide $100 million. The remaining $700 million should be secured at the conference that will be held in Ankara on 15 March. Our New York correspondent Envera Selimovic has the details.

[Selimovic] The program provides for the formation of an army of 55,000 soldiers, well trained and equipped with up-to-date equipment. In practice, it will mean the demobilization of over 200,000 soldiers.

In the initial stages, attention will be focused on preparing 14 mobile brigades, training officers, and supplying defense arms. According to the Dayton agreement, delivery of light arms is to start 90 days after the signing of the agreement and heavy arms and antiaircraft defense systems and helicopters 180 days after.

The program is cut in such a way that the equip and train [policy] should lead to integration of the two armies—the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council. For the time being the discussion is confined to a united line of command—that is, a joint command cadre who will have operational control over both military formations.

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According to James Pardew, who is practically the head of the program for the U.S. State Department, in the initial stages the equipment will be supplied to the less armed partner—the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

It is still not known which of the three competing American companies will take over the leadership of the program. The name will be announced very soon, the State Department said.

**B-H: Ganic Receives U.S. Government Delegation**

*LD1103233296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received John Kornblum, the U.S. President's assistant for Europe. Following the meeting Ganic and Kornblum made brief statements:

[Begin Ganic recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] Ladies and Gentlemen, we had very useful talks with Mr. Kornblum and his colleagues. This visit today is very important as it represents continuation of our work. The Dayton agreement must be consistently implemented. We are very pleased that our guests have come here to see for themselves that everything is proceeding according to plan.

As for us, we are very pleased with this visit. We have agreed to talk openly about all the problems that we have—the implementation, IFOR [Implementation Force], federation. We are pleased that continuous overseeing will be applied, that our progress will be measured. It is not enough only to make promises. Everyone has to fulfill what has been agreed. This was a very useful meeting and we are very pleased that the international community, particularly the United States, assumed the task of overseeing the consistent implementation of the Dayton agreement. [end recording]

In his statement, John Kornblum said:

[Begin Kornblum recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatiam translation] We came here with our delegation for a number of reasons. First, to show that we are approaching the D + 90 deadline when the entities will formally and completely come to life. The United States is obliged to oversee full implementation of the agreement. Here we have a team of experts who are working on all aspects of the agreement. Many of them have been doing this for two years. Many of them have only just started. We are determined not only to realize war operations [as heard], but also to provide help for the implementation of the Dayton agreement so that it should become important for this country and each of its citizens.

This was the goal of our visit during which we had very good talks with Mr. Ganic. We shall also have meetings with other officials. We shall also go to Zagreb to show how seriously we take the implementation. As I have already said, what is more important than the written document is that the implementation should be put into practice and that it should gain its significance and importance for everyone in Bosnia. [end recording]

**B-H: France Announces Inspections of Arms Stocks**

*AU1103180496 Paris AFP in English 1734 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, March 11 (AFP)—Some 80 international inspections of Bosnian, Croat and Serb arms stocks will begin Tuesday and continue until the end of June under the Dayton peace accords, the French foreign ministry said Monday [11 March].

Spokesman Jacques Rummelhardt said the checks would "verify exchanges of information on arms equipment and the organisation of the armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The inspections were a key factor in "the agreement on measures of confidence and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina" which the three parties signed on January 26 in Vienna under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The inspections, supervised by French General Francois Rozec, will be carried out by nine inspectors, four from one of the so-called "pilot countries"—the United States, France, Britain or Germany—one from the OSCE, and four from the parties involved.

The French spokesman stressed that the "verifications must contribute, through transparency and the necessary cooperation, to the process of restoring confidence between the various communities."

Each of the former belligerents will be able to carry out on-the-spot checks on the armed forces and heavy arms stocks of former enemies.

The checks will cover tanks, other armoured vehicles, artillery up to at least 75 mm calibre, aircraft and attack helicopters.

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**B-H: Consul in Milan on Refugee Status**

*96BA0168B Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 27-28 Jan 96 p 16*

[Interview with Dr. Muhamed Kresevljakovic, B-H Consul in Milan, by J. Calo; place and date not given: "The Status of Refugees Closes All Doors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *He is serving in Italy. Four months the mandate as B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] consul has been assigned to him. A former mayor of Sarajevo, Dr. Muhamed Kresevljakovic, during his two-year stay abroad, has "dropped in" on his city twice.*

[Calo] Since the return of our refugees is becoming increasingly current, are you receiving requests?

[Kresevljakovic] One-third, or 4,000, of our refugees in Italy want to return at this time. However, the problem is in the confirmation or approval for transit across Croatia, because individual visas are not given to those who have the status of refugees. It is even hard for our wounded, who have recovered after being treated in Italy, to obtain them. Only if you are employed or are a humanitarian worker can you get a visa.

[Calo] That means that the Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement is not still in effect?

[Kresevljakovic] There is no longer anything of it.

[Calo] So what do you say to these people then?

[Kresevljakovic] In this context I proposed to our MIP [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that a collection point be organized, through the Ministry for Refugees and Social Welfare in Ancona, for the return not only of refugees and displaced persons who are staying in Italy, but also those from all over Europe. There all obligations, e.g., customs duties, could be resolved on the spot, and, with the establishment of Ancona-Sarajevo, Ancona-Mostar, and Ancona-Tuzla air bridges, people could return home. With this, refugees, especially those driven out, would feel that the state was organized and functioning.

[Calo] How is their living situation in Italy?

[Kresevljakovic] They've adjusted somehow. But, I am sure that the situation is worse rather than better for the nearly 2,500 of them who live in casernes.

[Calo] Employment?

[Kresevljakovic] Those who have succeeded in finding a job work mainly as drivers or waiters, and doctors as nurses or technicians. Some work on the black market, while most of them are without work since Italy is the country, in relation to other members of the European Community, that is most feeling an economic crisis!

[Calo] Back in 1995 the recognition of our diplomats was supposed to have been legislatively regulated with the Italians.

[Kresevljakovic] The counselor in our embassy in Rome informed me that this agreement on reciprocity will be regulated by the middle of March 1996. However, it's only a problem with diplomats. With our documents, a Bosnian citizen in Italy cannot establish, say, an enterprise. New driver's licenses are recognized in some parts of Italy, while in others, no. But, the embassy should resolve this, and not a consulate, and we have already sent them a memorandum on this twice.

[Calo] What have you done in recent years to improve Italian assistance to Bosnia?

[Kresevljakovic] This refers to Venice, whose mayor informed me that they sent goods to Sarajevo last year worth one million marks.

[Calo] Isn't the current mayor, Dr. Tarik Kupusovic, responsible for this?

[Kresevljakovic] When I was the "first" man of the city, Innsbruck offered us a satellite telephone. However, they couldn't provide me with money for a certain number of conversations. Next, Barcelona offered me such a telephone and, before the expiration of my mandate, they told me there would be a telephone and money. Last year in Parma, Kupusovic told me that "I went for that telephone of yours." No one knows the "history" of those agreements, but everyone will say, "Look at those dumb ones, they couldn't do it in three years, but Kupusovic goes once and brings a telephone!"

[Calo] Good. What is your accomplishment?

[Kresevljakovic] Italian mayors, businessmen, and builders are ready to enter Bosnia. They are especially interested in the factories that existed, or exist, in Bosnia, so that they can clean them up and start production. For example, the city of Kuneo, near Torino, is interested in renovating the "Zora" chocolate factory. Bologna wants to do a crockery factory, another a glass and window frame factory... I received letters of thanks from Zavidovici, Mostar, and Bugojno, to which Italian cities, with my involvement, also sent aid.

**B-H: HDZ Demands Sarajevo Croats 'Be Fully Protected'**

*LD0803190896 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sarajevo HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] city committee today warned that the national and political interests of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina's capital must be fully protected.

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If not, neither democratic nor civilian rights could be secured.

In its statement, signed by chairman Ivan Vidovic, the Sarajevo HDZ city committee says that this political party is determined to persevere in its efforts to ensure that the establishment of rule in the city is not done without the participation of the Croat people. The Sarajevo Croats are rightly demanding to be included in legislative, executive, and legal bodies in the city. This demand is not motivated by their desire to have overall power, but by a need to protect their own national and political rights and thus remain in Sarajevo, the city which equally belongs to Croats, Bosniaks, and members of other nations, the Sarajevo HDZ city committee says in its statement.

**B-H: HDZ Rejects 'Unilateral' Decisions on Sarajevo Setup**

*AU1203113196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina yesterday held a session in Mostar chaired by party leader Bozo Rajic, devoted to the implementation of the peace agreements and the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This has been stated by the office of the chairman of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The session was attended by Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federation Constituent Assembly Chairman Mariofil Ljubic, and all the Croat ministers in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the transitional period.

Following a detailed and comprehensive discussion, the Presidency of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina unanimously adopted a series of conclusions and assessments, from which we present the following:

Implementing the peace agreements and responsibly working on the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the authorized representatives of the Croat people of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been refraining from actions and statements that would in any way obstruct or slow down the establishment of the Federation in line with the political decisions of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Presidency of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina has assessed as positive all the results in the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but—faced with the actions by the partner side—has to conclude with concern that the Bosniak representatives have been undertaking measures that have been slowing down and impeding the progress in the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Presidency of the HDZ is calling on the partner side, and particularly the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], to take a serious and responsible approach without delay to the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the ultimate goal, with equal rights and responsibilities with the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The HDZ Presidency is committed to hastening the process of adopting the symbols of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a solution that will ensure the special nature of the symbols of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the preservation and use of national symbols in accordance with the law. The presidency considers very important the implementation of the agreement and the creation of conditions for the accommodation and work of the ministries of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Mostar. The HDZ Presidency is sincerely interested in a rapid establishment of the bodies of authority in all the cantons, and will enable the constitution of the cantons with a majority Croat population. It is also expressing full readiness for a simultaneous constitution of authorities in the cantons with a special regime of administration.

The HDZ Presidency considers it its inalienable right to have a proportional participation of policemen of Croat nationality in Sarajevo and in areas to be ceded to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and supports the activities of the Sarajevo HDZ Committee concerning the nonacceptance of unilateral decisions by the partner side on Sarajevo's organization. The HDZ Presidency also deems very important the finalization of work and functioning by 1 May this year of the Herzeg-Bosnia coat of arms, as well as the use of right to presentation in the media that function under the name of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**B-H: 'Short-Term Agreement' Reached in Kulen Vakuf**

*AU1103165196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference today, Implementation Force spokesman Major Simon Haslock addressed yesterday's incident in Kulen Vakuf in which two groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina police officers attempted to seize Kulen Vakuf; the outcome was unresolved.

Following talks mediated by the international police and the multinational southeastern division, the two sides reached a short-term agreement: the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] withdrew to the barracks in Kulen Vakuf, while the Bosnian civilian police was granted

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permission to patrol the left bank of the Una River unarmed and under international police supervision, Haslock said.

**B-H: Mayor Opposes EU Mandate Extension in Mostar**

*LD1103132496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The decision of the EU administrator of Mostar, Hans Koschnick, to administer the central zone in Mostar was reached against the wishes of the Croat side, Mijo Brajkovic, the mayor of the western part of Mostar, said today. Commenting on the EU foreign minister's decision to extend the EU administration's mandate to the end of this year, Brajkovic expressed the hope that the elections, due to take place in May, would be held, and that a town administration and a mayor would be elected. According to him, this will probably result in changes in the mandate of a new EU administrator in Mostar.

**B-H: IFOR Appropriation of Property Unauthorized**

*96BA0180A Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 3 Feb 96 p 2*

[Article by Sa. Tunovic: "How IFOR Relinquished Skenderija: Take as Much as You Want, Master"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The appropriation of Skenderija property came to a head two days ago; the SJB Center has no authority; everything that could be hauled away was taken; no response to appeals by Skenderija employees.*

After countless letters and meetings, the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops finally, seven days ago, verbally informed Skenderija Center that they will relinquish the occupied space in the facility. In so doing, they emphasized that they will relinquish the facility gradually until 20 February 1996, when they are supposed to be out of the center entirely.

"We have awaited the departure of IFOR troops from the premises of Skenderija Center with impatience, as a holiday, but their departure has brought only distress and calamity. They are taking away everything, from chairs and parquet floor tiles to equipment for trade fairs," said Sadik Hasanbegovic, the general manager of Skenderija Center at a press conference yesterday.

**Even the Restaurant "Stripped"**

There are French troops quartered in Skenderija Center as part of IFOR. The experience with these soldiers while they were still part of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] was exceptionally bitter and painful. During the two and a half years that they have been at Skenderija, they have inflicted $3.5 million worth of damage on the facility and equipment there.

Even now that they are bearing the IFOR insignia, their attitude toward the facility and equipment has not changed one bit. Over the past 45 days of their stay there, they have furthered the previous damage, and in some areas they have jeopardized the very functionality of the facility.

The appropriation of Skenderija Center property came to a head two days ago, when the IFOR troops stepped up the pace of removing property and began loading trucks and containers simultaneously at 10 to 15 points within the complex. Workers at the center were unable to prevent the hauling away of equipment because the members of IFOR simply continued to "pack" things away. They employed force whenever they encountered resistance. The SJB Center responded to an appeal from Skenderija workers, but since it has no authority to contact and control IFOR troops, it was unable to do anything.

The French soldiers completely cleared out Restaurant '84 and prepared containers for that haul. Removed from the restaurant were all chairs, armchairs, tables, partition walls, doors, windows, mirrors, and even the piano. While the workers were trying to save the inventory from the restaurant, several trucks loaded with trade fair (exhibit booth) structures, chairs, conference tables, and rugs were leaving the Skenderija vicinity.

**Workers Detained**

We asked Slaven Hamzic, the center's technical manager, "While the French troops were quartered at the facility, did you have access to their part, and in general what was the procedure for entering that part of the facility?"

"On one occasion, when a special commission to survey the damage came from Zagreb, we were able to enter only two large halls, where tents for sleeping had been set up. That part is the only one that we have been able to see. Twice they detained us while we were walking around at the time. Even the commission was unable to view all the parts of the facility where they were quartered. But members of UNPROFOR and IFOR toured the entire Skenderija facility. At that time, they broke down more than 100 doors (wooden, metal, glass) that were locked during their visit, and in that way they became fully familiarized with this center's contents. Even the garage in this complex did not escape the attention of the peacekeepers. Around 70 to 80 cars that

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were inside it were broken into, and mostly the tape decks were taken."

There has still been no response to the appeals by Skenderija employees. However, they hope that with the help of the responsible state institutions, through joint efforts and appropriate measures, they can prevent the further dismantling and appropriation of Skenderija Center. It is now necessary to save everything that we have managed to save over the course of the last four years, especially since Skenderija is of exceptional importance and inestimable value to the future of our city.

**B-H: Presidency Urges IFOR To Increase Suburban Patrols**

*AU1103193796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency today invited Implementation Force [IFOR] Commander Admiral Leighton Smith and Michael Steiner, high commissioner for the implementation of the Dayton agreement deputy, to inform them about the handover process in Sarajevo's suburbs.

Owing to frequent arson attacks and the general destruction of housing and communal facilities and installations, and threats and maltreatment of the local population by the Pale Serbs, the Presidency appealed to the international forces to increase the number of military and police patrols in Ilidza and Grbavica. At the same time, IFOR and the international police were asked to protect the firemen extinguishing the fires, who will be put on a state of maximal mobility. [sentence as heard]

**B-H: Serb Police Set Fire to Police Station in Ilidza**

*AU1103140196 Paris AFP in English 1353 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 11 (AFP)—Serb policemen in a Sarajevo suburb due to revert to the mainly-Moslem Bosnian authorities set fire to their police station Monday [11 March] before quitting the district, journalists at the scene reported.

Smoke could be seen billowing out of the building after the police left, firing their guns in the air, journalists said.

Troops of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force Monday took up a stronger presence in Ilidza than in previous days but failed to stop the police setting fire to the building.

On Tuesday, some 90 police of the Moslem-Croat federation will start patrols in Ilidza, one of the five Sarajevo districts coming under the control of the Sarajevo authorities in line with Bosnia's Dayton peace agreement.

The district, held by the Serbs throughout the three-and-a-half year war, has been hit by arson and looting, descending into virtual lawlessness in recent days after being abandoned by thousands of Serbs ahead of its handover to the mainly-Moslem authorities.

**B-H: Federation Promises Protection to Ilidza Serbs**

*AU1103174696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[Report by Lejla Tafro—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Chairman of the Ilidza Municipality Interim Council Husein Mahmutovic comments on preparations for return to the area:

[Mahmutovic] [Words indistinct] for the reintegration of the Ilidza Municipality, drafted at the Sarajevo city level. The return of refugees from the Ilidza Municipality will be launched as planned, that is, as the plan stipulates. We in the office, located in the (?Novi Grad building) opposite the television station, each day receive some 250 applications for return. We explain the procedure to the people, and it boils down to following the plan and program drafted at the city level: First, there is the security check, as we must not allow people who have managed to stay alive for four years to enter their apartments and step on an explosive device, and be either killed or maimed. This procedure has only one goal, to secure maximum safety for every citizen who wishes to return. We have already had talks with the city Executive Council and have agreed on the amount of goods that will be put at our disposal from commodity reserves. We have already made contact with representatives of state communities [as heard] to secure building materials. True, the quantities are negligible, minimal, but they are initial quantities. We must realize the people's immense wish to return.

[Tafro] The legitimate Federation authorities, in an attempt to keep those Serbs in their homes who lived in Ilidza before the war and who have not committed war crimes have held several meetings with their representatives. These meetings, under the auspices of international mediators, have settled several issues: The most important is that Serb representatives will participate in the executive and legislative authority in the municipality. Moreover, several practical issues pertaining to education, health care, employment, freedom of movement, and so forth have also been settled. Here is what Mr. Mahmutovic said about these issues:

[Mahmutovic] On this occasion, I would like to convey a clear message to Ilidza Serbs and appeal to them

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to stay in their houses and apartments. Do not fall prey to propaganda. We truly wish and promise a tolerant coexistence. We promise safety and protection equal for all people. The Federation political forces comprise all three Bosnian peoples, so we have Serb, Croatian, and Bosniak representatives. The criterion for their appointment was not their nationality, but their professional achievements and this is a firm guarantee of equal treatment for all.

[Tafro] So far, almost 10,000 people have applied to return to Ilidza. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Departing Ilidza Serbs Fire on Federation Police**

*AU1103175796 Paris AFP in English 1729 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 11 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb rule in a Sarajevo suburb ended in dramatic style Monday [11 March] with fires raging across the district and local police departing in a hail of gun fire and explosions, a day before the area reverts to Moslem-Croat federation authority.

Ignoring the heavily armed French soldiers deployed across the street as a security measure, Serb policemen quit their station in Ilidza early afternoon after smashing windows and setting fire to the upper floors.

Jumping into a handful of battered and noisy cars, they raced off around the deserted modern suburb firing guns into the air and throwing hand grenades out of their speeding vehicles.

Fires lit in several nearby buildings cast a hazy smoke over the whole area where NATO helicopters wheeled overhead monitoring the spectacle.

Earlier, Bosnian Serb officers refused to help when a UN police officer asked them to arrest a gang of arsonists. "We can do nothing now," a Serb commander told the Spanish policeman.

Not long after the Serbs left, Federation police came under fire at a dividing line five kilometers (three miles) away. A Federation officer, whose cap bore the fresh nick of a bullet round, told AFP that Serb policemen fired four shots at him from a passing unmarked car.

A spate of arson and looting has swept through the deserted Ilidza suburb due to come under Moslem-Croat control on Tuesday. Thousands of Serbs have already fled the area fearing life under the government of their former enemies.

The Serb authorities have done little to prevent the outbreak of lawlessness merely watching as industrial complexes go up in flames and apartment blocks burn, occasionally trapping residents inside.

As the police made their way noisily out of town, Serb civilian leaders were more low key in their departure. Nedjeljko Prstojovic, the departing Serb mayor of Ilidza, handed over to a Serb staying behind at a special ceremony held in the municipal building. [sentence as recieved]

In a maudlin address, he said: "This is a historic and tragic moment for the Serb people. We hope that the Serb nation will be protected and that this ethnic Serb land will preserved."

Blaming the "injustice" of the Dayton peace accord under which Prstojovic's leaders in Belgrade signed away Serb-held suburbs ringing the capital, he added, "our tragic departure I do not consider to be a final one. Serbs have lived here since the 17th century."

With both civil and police authorities now out of the district, Ilidza has been left in the hands of arson gangs and the few Serbs who have decided to stay behind in their homes.

As burning timbers lying on the pavement smoked and fires crackled in the distance, elderly civilians scurried past clutches of menacing young men. One woman, tears in her eyes, approached a group of French Implementation Force (IFOR) soldiers. "I am so terrified. My husband is a Moslem. Is there anyone who can help?" she asked.

Elsewhere, close to a fire raging behind him, a drunk mumbled incoherently as he held up a book dedicated to Tito, the late Communist dictator of the former Yugoslavia. Tito's death 15 years ago began the countdown to the war in three of the Balkan federation's republics which started in 1991 and effectively ended with the Dayton peace accord signed last December.

Bosnia's conflict which saw rebel Bosnian Serb forces seize more than half the country and besiege its capital was by far the worst of the wars. Tens of thousands, the majority Moslem, were killed in the fighting and millions chased from their homes.

Only Grbavica, one of the five Serb-held suburbs to be transferred to the Moslem-Croat federation, remains in Serb hands. On Monday, UN officials warned the suburb was "very tense" ahead of its transfer on March 19.

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**B-H: IFOR Supports Federation Police Move to Ilidza**

*AU1203103996 Paris AFP in English 1008 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 12 (AFP)—Police from Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation were set Tuesday [12 March] to take control of a last Serb-held western district of Sarajevo as NATO peacekeepers fanned out, taking up positions across the suburb.

Some 90 police, mostly Moslems, were shortly before midday to enter Ilidza, a western suburb held throughout the war by the Bosnian Serbs but abandoned by them in recent days.

Serb arsonists have in recent days torched dozens of buildings in Ilidza while organised gangs of thugs have moved through the district looting and intimidating those who wanted to stay.

French troops with the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) Tuesday deployed armoured cars and light tanks onto the road from Sarajevo to Ilidza to prepare the arrival of the Bosnian police.

IFOR soldiers, their faces hidden behind dark ski masks to fight the bitter cold, posted on street corners, standing around small bonfires fires they had lit to try to keep warm, checking cars in and out of the suburb.

The streets were littered with trash left behind by those who have fled: pieces of abandoned furniture and blankets that were once hung across the streets to shield residents from snipers lay scattered across the roads while electrical wiring dangled from smashed street poles.

In a few dark streets and alleys, the last farm tractors were leaving, hauling the remaining stragglers and their belongings out of Ilidza and completing the exodus that has put thousands of Serbs on the roads of Bosnia in recent weeks.

A last Serb-held suburb, the city centre Grbavica district, reverts to the Sarajevo authorities next week, completing the opening up of the Bosnian capital to the rest of Federation territory.

**B-H: Interior Minister 'Delighted' Over Ilidza Takeover**

*AU1203120796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[Report on interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Interior Minister Avdo Hebib by Fuad Cibukcic from the Sarajevo district of Ilidza—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cibukcic] Esteemed listeners, good day to you from Ilidza.

After four years, the forces of the federation police entered this district of Sarajevo at 1145 [1045 GMT] today. The transfer of authority in Ilidza passed without incident.

Unfortunately, the first impression one gets of Ilidza is unfavorable. A large number of housing facilities as well as production plants, such as the bicycle and tool factory, have been burned down. At the moment the forces of the federation police are being deployed at their regular tasks, while the men from the special antisabotage unit of the Federation Ministry of the Interior have been checking out facilities which are thought to have been booby-trapped. Several thousand expelled Ilidza people, visibly excited over returning home, have entered Ilidza together with the federation police forces. The streets of this district are at the moment crowded with the now former expellees.

Esteemed listeners, we have here Interior Minister Avdo Hebib. Minister, the reintegration of Sarajevo is slowly coming to an end. Only Grbavica remains. What are your impressions at the moment?

[Hebib] I am truly delighted that we have had a chance to reintegrate today the district of Ilidza into the unified city of Sarajevo. I hope that, God willing, we will do the same with Grbavica soon, with Faletici, with [word indistinct], with parts of Trnovo, and link up with Gorazde. That is our plan, and I hope that we will achieve this as successfully as we have done with our previous tasks.

I would like to use this opportunity to inform our president—who is undergoing treatment and is feeling well, thank God—on behalf of the members of the Interior Ministry that we have completed this task, and that we will complete all the others on his orders.

[Cibukcic] We have seen here that a number of facilities have been burnt down. The Serb forces had destroyed a lot until two days ago. What would you say to this behavior?

[Hebib] That was scandalous but the world saw who was behind it, it saw against whom we had to fight. Members

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of the Implementation Force and the international police force tried to save some facilities here. They made the effort but it turned out to be impossible. Our firefighters, who are to be commended, entered the Ilidza area and tried to put out fires, to save facilities. Unfortunately the entire world public could see what they did to Ilidza. We can still see what is going on in Grbavica. So I think that the world public should judge for itself these people, who were here and then had to escape from the area. We do not have to qualify them in any way.

[Cibukcic] Were there any problems about the participation of policemen of Croat nationality in the federal forces that have entered Ilidza?

[Hebib] No, there have been no problems. We agreed on the operative part of the plan with my deputy Mr. Leotar, and it has been carried out by the chief of the center for security services.

**B-H: Bildt's Deputy Says 'Misinformation' Caused Exodus**

*LD1203161796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 March (SRNA)—The Speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, Momcilo Krajisnik, received deputy high representative Michael Steiner in Pale today.

Before the meeting, Steiner confirmed that Muslim police had entered Ilidza today, but said that the international community was not responsible for the evacuation of the Serb population which was caused by "misinformation."

Krajisnik-Steiner talks are in progress and they are expected to discuss the implementation of the peace agreement, placing emphasis on the situation in Serb Sarajevo.

**B-H: Serbs: NATO Used 'Low-Intensity Nuclear Weapons'**

*LD1103211496 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] While carrying out air strikes against Serb positions around Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Majevica at the end of August and the beginning of September last year, NATO used low-intensity nuclear weapons [nuklearno naoruzanje niskog intenziteta]. This has been learned from sources close to top circles of the Serb Republic Army whose experts—aided by teams from Belgrade—came to these conclusions while examining the terrain and remains of air bombs in these locations.

In their combat assaults on Serb defense positions and Serb villages, the NATO air force and Rapid Reaction Force used the most modern combat weapons including low-intensity nuclear weapons which cause a certain degree of long-term radiation. In these actions, state-of-the-art combat equipment for mass destruction of population and property was used, which is almost unthinkable on the threshold of the 21st century.

After the NATO bombing campaign against these areas, the Serb Republic Army main staff set up expert teams to establish the consequences and damage inflicted. In addition to establishing the extent of destruction of civilian and military facilities and the number of casualties, after a certain period of time these teams detected changes that have taken place in people and cattle, indicative of being symptoms of diseases caused by radiation.

Immediately after establishing these facts, the main staff of the Serb Republic Army set up new expert teams made up of physicians and officers for antinuclear, chemical, and biological protection, who went to the locations and established the state of affairs. In the course of this investigation, the teams detected symptoms of radiation-linked diseases in several score people and unusual behavior in cattle.

At the same time, in the wider area where projectiles, air bombs, and shells landed a higher degree of radioactive radiation was recorded. The first report by these teams, after touring areas around Sarajevo, Gorazde, and the Majevica TV transmitter, spoke about the application of low-intensity nuclear weapons, which called for the setting up of a larger group of experts. It has been learned that this action was embargoed as strictly confidential, in order to prevent intimidation of the population before investigation is completed.

However, subsequent events and the mass bombing of Serb positions and facilities and a heavy joint offensive by Croat-Muslim forces on several fronts prevented the teams from completing their investigation. A statement by one of the experts who was involved in the investigation says that it is beyond any doubt that in its attacks on the Serbs, NATO used and tested all the most modern air and artillery weapons, including low-intensity nuclear weapons, which cause long-term radiation and contamination of the environment; the final consequences of this will show in the population and the cattle to a more significant degree only after several months or even years.

These details have on several occasions been presented to some foreign agencies and TV crews, but the international community has been persistently silent about it. Recently, even though after a considerable

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delay, expert teams from Belgrade established during an examination of remains of exploded bombs in a number of locations that there is a significant level of radiation; relevant TV reports have been made in this connection.

The Serb Republic Army main headquarters said that the investigation has not been completed. Well-informed sources have said that details of these analyses have been sent to military representatives of some countries, which has not helped either.

It is presumed that this precisely might have been the reason for the insistence by the United States and military representatives of the Pentagon in Dayton that areas in which nuclear combat weapons were used should be transferred to the Muslim-Croat federation, which would prevent complete investigation.

**B-H: Kasagic, IPTF Chief Discuss War Prisoners**

*LD1103160696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1345 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 11 Mar (SRNA)—Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, held talks in Banja Luka today with the delegation of the International Police Task Force [IPTF] on unfulfilled obligations concerning the release of war prisoners.

Kasagic said that this was one of the main problems in the implementation of the Dayton agreement and added that all the war prisoners should have been released by 19 January.

Robert Gelbard, head of the IPTF delegation, expressed his satisfaction with good cooperation of the International Police Force and IFOR [Implementation Force] with the Serb Republic authorities.

He said that the ones who had not fulfilled their obligations stemming from the Dayton agreement on release of war prisoners must do so immediately.

Gelbard said that he would deal in the future exclusively with the implementation of the provisions of the Dayton agreement concerning police forces and public security.

**B-H: Serbs Receive List of 130 POW's Held in Tuzla**

*AU1203092296 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 8 Mar 96*

[Report by Ljubinko Djuric on "Muslim" committee for exchange of POW's meeting with Serb committee in IFOR camp near Brcko on 7 March]

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the Muslim committee for the exchange of prisoners of war handed over the list (?lists) of Serb soldiers imprisoned in Tuzla to the representatives of the Serb committee at yesterday's meeting in an IFOR [Implementation Force] camp near Brcko. Ljubinko Djuric has a report:

[Djuric] After half a year of uncertainty, the Muslim authorities finally openly admitted they are holding a large number of members of the Army of the Serb Republic in their prisons by presenting the list of these people to the Serb side. However, it is quite certain that the other side is holding a much larger number of Serb soldiers, not allowing access to [passage indistinct].

The list relates to the prisoners in the largest Muslim prison in Tuzla, where, according to [word indistinct] information, there are 130 Serbs, which is the number that the (?Red Cross) [words indistinct] also registered. In fact, they registered 131, but Dragomir Pavlovic, born in (?1917), died in the meantime.

Dusko Pasalic, born in (?1969), is also not on the list—according to the information provided by the Muslim representatives, he was transferred to Zenica, where criminal proceedings were instituted against him. Milan Tadic, born in (?1962), is not on the list either—the other side claims he had decided [words indistinct] to stay in Tuzla.

Therefore, apart from the prisoners registered earlier, 10 of which have been released, 52 more have been registered. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Serb Official Meets Russian State Duma Delegation**

*LD1003211896 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 10 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A Russian State Duma delegation visited Bijeljina today. It met Serb Republic government and Bijeljina municipality representatives and discussed the current situation in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, the upcoming elections, and the Serb Republic's economic cooperation with the Russian Federation.

[Correspondent] Duma representatives headed by Sergey Zlotov, met Milomir Draganic, the deputy prime minister of the Serb Republic, and representatives of the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly in Bijeljina today to discuss the ways of intensifying contacts and bilateral cooperation.

A number of problems facing the Serb Republic was mentioned during the constructive and detailed talks. Speaking about the role and significance of IFOR's [Implementation Force] presence in the region, Mr. Draganic told the Russian representatives about IFOR's biased behavior and its failure to respect the Dayton agreement, recalling in particular the arrest of Serb officers, General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic.

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Draganic told the Russian parliamentary delegation about fears that such incidents could be repeated in the coming days and he said that this sowed suspicion and insecurity among the people.

In view of this type of behavior by IFOR and the increasing number of Western media reports alleging that Serb Republic elections could be annulled, Zlotov promised a greater role of the Russian Federation in securing the legitimacy [of the Serb Republic] in the upcoming elections and in the implementation of other details of the Dayton agreement. [passage omitted]

**B-H: City Canton Constituted Despite 'Misunderstandings'**

*AU1103211196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a series of misunderstandings and conflicts, the Sarajevo Canton was finally constituted today. Professor Sabira Hadzovic, a Party of Democratic Action [SDA] candidate was elected governor. The first vice governor is Jovo Andric from the Social Democratic Party [SDP], and the second one is Nermin Pecanac, candidate of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBSD].

Following interparty negotiations regarding the distribution of posts in the canton, it was proposed that the SDP should propose for the next cantonal session a candidate for chairman of the transitional assembly of Sarajevo Canton. Miroslava Silic from the UBSD was elected one of the deputies, while the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] is to nominate the other deputy. The Constitution of Sarajevo Canton and the Rules of Procedure of the Cantonal Assembly were also adopted at today's session. Moreover, a verification committee was also elected. It comprises: Abad Dzemal and Alija Ramic from the SDA, Arif Adnan from the SDP, and Arif Baksic from the UBSD. The HDZ, which was supposed to nominate a candidate for the verification committee, refused to do so, so that the fifth member, Miroslav Mocevic, was elected from the SDP. Ivan Vidovic, president of the HDZ city council, explained the party's refusal to nominate a candidate saying that the HDZ did not acknowledge today's session, and that it did not want to constitute the Sarajevo Canton without consultations at federal level. This statement was just the beginning of misunderstandings and dissatisfaction expressed by HDZ representatives. Following several lengthy recesses, Assembly Chairman Tarik Kupusovic ended the assembly's work. He explained the decision by saying that conditions had not been met for the verification of the mandate, as no agreement had been reached with the HDZ and the Croatian corps. The reason for this is the fact that the city assembly forwarded an amendment to the federal Constitution to the Constituent Assembly, which asks that the Sarajevo city assembly should evolve into the cantonal transitional council by election time.

After city Assembly Chairman Tarik Kupusovic and a part of the deputies left the hall, Omer Ibrahimagic took the floor and said that the assembly would continue work despite the circumstances, and that the session would be chaired by the oldest deputy in the assembly. It was established that the oldest deputy was SDA member Halil Bjelak. After the recess, the assembly continued working under Bjelak. Having established a quorum, the report of the verification commission, the Constitution, and the Rules of Procedure of the Cantonal Assembly were adopted. The cantonal president and vice presidents were also elected [words indistinct]. Prompted by the forming of Sarajevo Canton, the newly appointed Cantonal Governor Sabira Hadzovic said:

We are faced with a serious task and that is to organize Sarajevo according to the Dayton Agreement and the agreement between SDA and HDZ representatives, that is, between the highest representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, President Kresimir Zubak and Vice President Ejup Ganic. The goal of today's session, Professor Hadzovic said, is to constitute a functioning city in time for elections, because once the city assembly stops working, a vacuum will ensue that will paralyze the city's basic functions.

**B-H: Another Mass Grave Discovered in Sanski Most Area**

*AU0803201696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Another mass grave has been found in Sanski Most Municipality—the 11th found in the 150 days of liberty in this municipality. It was found in the village of Skrljevita, 7 km from the center of the municipality, and it dates from 2 December 1992.

[Words indistinct] that date, nine citizens of Croatian nationality were shot in the village of Donji Kruhari near the Glamosnica River. On that day, a group of ethnic Croats from the village of Skrljevita set off for Sanski Most to go shopping, never suspecting that they would be liquidated. The Serb authorities in Sanski Most ordered that the bodies of the killed Croats be buried in a mass grave in the Skrljevita Village by 1500 the next day. One witness survived.

One month after this mass crime against Croatian citizens, another crime was committed in the village of (Stapina) when the same group of criminals killed seven Croats from the village of (Stapina).

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**Croatia: Granic Briefs Parliament on Talks With FRY FM**

*LD1203122296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Question time in the Chamber of Counties [of the Croatian parliament] lasted for over an hour and a half. Questions were posed to Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa and his ministers. Most questions referred to the measures to protect agricultural production, road building plans, and economic recovery in the liberated areas. Questions were also asked about granting broadcasting licenses to radio stations, specifically to Otocac radio. The time of the elections in the Primorje-Gorani county was also on the list of the questions asked. The chamber of counties deputies asked Foreign Minister Mato Granic to brief them about his talks yesterday with Yugoslav Foreign Minsiter Milan Milutinovic. Dr. Granic said that both sides voiced their support for the Dayton agreement and that the test of all future relations with Belgrade will be the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, he said.

The Croatian side is not however satisfied with the negotiations so far about missing and captured Croatian citizens and the failure to find the truth about them, Mate Granic said. He announced that the new round of talks with the Yugoslav side would take place in Belgrade at the end of April.

**Croatia: FRY's Milutinovic Sees 'Great Step' in Relations**

*AU1103202096 Paris AFP in English 1942 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 11 (AFP)—Belgrade and Zagreb "took a great step" Monday [11 March] towards normalising relations, signing three economic and transport agreements nearly five years after Croatia declared its independence, Belgrade foreign minister Milan Milutinovic said.

The agreements dealing with reopening the Zagreb-Belgrade main road and of rail and air links, the restart of full telecommunications links, and the reopening an oil pipeline passing through eastern Croatia, he said.

Milutinovic said the agreements were "a great step towards normalising relations," which were shattered in 1991 when Zagreb declared its independance from Belgrade and Serbia gave its backing to a bloody Serb rebellion.

The Belgrade foreign minister and his Croatian counterpart Mate Granic held more than five hours of talks earlier Monday.

Granic said he would visit Belgrade in the second half of April, his second visit since 1991.

Belgrade still refuses to recognise Zagreb following its declaration of independence.

**Croatia: Belgrade TV on Milutinovic Visit to Zagreb**

*AU1103210696 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Milutinovic, Yugoslav federal minister of foreign affairs, and Zoran Vujovic, federal minister of transport and communications, visited Zagreb today. Their visit represents the continuation of contacts and political dialogue that were carried out during the visit by Minister Granic to Yugoslavia in early January. The talks mostly dwelled upon the package of traffic agreements, commissioning the Belgrade-Zagreb highway, railway and air traffic, as well as telecommunications. Political agreement has been reached about most of the specific issues. Here is Dusan Cukic reporting from Zagreb:

[Begin recording] [Cukic] Discussed were also economic problems, as well as many political issues of vital importance. One of the members of the Yugoslav delegation is Traffic Minister Zoran Vujovic and the Croatian delegation also includes heads of the Ministries for Economy and Foreign Affairs.

Yugoslav Assistant Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic told a news conference attended by many journalists about the first part of the talks:

[Jovanovic] The talks passed in a constructive atmosphere, with full mutual respect, and a visible effort and interest in reaching agreements about all issues on the agenda or—in the cases where this was not currently possible for objective reasons—in narrowing positions. We can say that in the majority of specific issues Mr. Simonovic [deputy Croatian foreign minister] mentioned, specific agreement has been reached, and the two ministers assigned tasks to experts who are now working on preparing specific documents.

[Cukic] Journalists have been told that an announcement will be issued on the talks and their results, and the two ministers are also expected to issue joint statements.

Late this evening here in Zagreb, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic met President Franjo Tudjman. Minister Milutinovic also had a long and cordial talk with Serbs living in Croatia in the Bureau of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Their most topical vital problems were touched upon. With this, the one-day working visit by the Yugoslav foreign minister and the

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Yugoslav delegation was concluded late this evening. [end recording]

**Croatia: Croatia, FRY Continue Steps Toward Normalization**

*LD1103215496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1959 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 11 Mar (TANJUG)—Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic, the foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Croatia respectively, today had detailed talks on all issues of importance for advancing the peace process and normalizing bilateral relations.

Milutinovic's visit to Zagreb marks the continuation of contacts and the political dialogue initiated during Granic's visit to Belgrade in mid-January.

As TANJUG has learned, the talks were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides expressed an interest in and readiness to work toward full normalization of relations, fully aware of the importance which the normalization will have toward consolidating the peace process, and for peace and stability in the region as a whole.

At the end of the talks at a brief ceremony at around 2000 this evening, the two ministers signed the so-called minutes [zapisnik] from today's meeting, which regulate a number of issues of special interest to both countries.

Among other things, the sides agree to reopen the Adriatic oil pipeline, to regulate air transport and the use of international air corridors, to expand the powers of the two governmental offices in Belgrade and Zagreb to include the issuing of travel documents to citizens of the two countries, and helping people with issues concerning their status in the two states and representing their interests.

An agreement was also reached to open the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and railway line. Separate documents will be drafted to decide the time and way of resuming traffic on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and railway.

The two sides expressed common interest in cooperation with other international players in implementing the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the basic agreement on the Slavonia-Baranja region.

The ministers stressed the need to speed up the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement on Bosnia, and to secure conditions as soon as possible for free and democratic elections within the existing deadline.

The importance was also stressed of the need to embark as soon as possible on the economic recovery and reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were described as being of both economic and political significance.

By all accounts, the talks in Zagreb today can be described as a step forward in the efforts to fully stabilize the situation in former Yugoslavia and to regulate relations between the FRY and Croatia.

Some controversial issues still remain to be resolved, but the FRY's principled positions remain valid and no changes have been made to them.

**Croatia: Croatian, FRY FM's Sign Transport Accords**

*LD1103210296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks between Dr. Mate Granic and Milan Milutinovic, the Croatian and Yugoslav foreign ministers, accompanied by their aides, ended this evening with the signing of a number of bilateral documents followed by statements for the press.

The documents will encourage the speedy reopening of the Belgrade-Zagreb road, railway, and telecommunication links between the two countries. Civil aviation will also be reestablished, including cooperation between air traffic controls of the two states.

An agreement was reached on use of the Adriatic oil pipeline and also on consular services in the offices of the governments of the two countries in Zagreb and Belgrade.

Ministers Granic and Milutinovic described the one-day meeting as successful and announced new measures toward the full normalization of relations between the two countries.

**Croatia: General Discusses U.S. Military Assistance**

*AU1203113296 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 96 pp 2-3*

["Exclusive" interview with Major General Pavao Miljavac, assistant to the Croatian Army chief of staff, by Mario Galic: "Minnesota Will Be Mentor to the Croatian Army!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three weeks ago for the first time since the establishment of the Croatian state and the Croatian Army, an official delegation of the Ministry of Defense visited the United States of America. Major General Pavao Miljevac, assistant to the Croatian Army Chief of Staff for the Home Guard, was also one of the members of the delegation, which was headed by Minister Gojko Susak.

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[Galic] General, why is it that this first official visit, moreover at the highest level possible, of the Ministry of Defense is taking place exactly now?

[Miljavac] The entire visit of the Ministry of Defense delegation is but the continuation of a policy that has been supported by the leadership of the Republic of Croatia from the very beginning, which referred to our wish to enter Western associations, first of all the NATO alliance, which is our permanent orientation. The delegation was received at the highest level as a delegation of an equal, internationally recognized state. The visit has several characteristics, one of which was, as I have said, political. We also talked about the opportunities of joining Western military alliances and associations but also about concrete military and technical cooperation, and first of all about the possibility of educating Croatian officers in the United States of America, as well as in some Western countries, mostly NATO members. During our visit we also visited two training centers. One of them is in Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. That is the center for the joint training at the level of a command staff school, equipped with the most contemporary systems and a combat simulation center. At this center officers are being educated, ranking commanders of companies, battalions, and brigades, and staff officers. The second training center we visited was the infantry testing center in Fort Benning, where, I would say, that overall military thought regarding infantry, as well as equipment, is concentrated. Within that center we have seen the infantry noncommissioned officers' academy, for the education of officers at all levels, and the infantry units training center, and the center for the special training of Rangers. They showed the training grounds for the training of educational regiments and specialities, and the training grounds for the mechanized infantry. We also saw part of the center in which newly developed infantry weapons are tested. One cannot start assembly line production if something has not passed the testing at that center. Technical instructions on how to use weapons are written there, and approval issued for weapons to be introduced into operational usage in the U.S. Army.

After those two days we returned to the Pentagon, where we were received by the commander of the National Guard, which has some similarities with our Home Guard. We were informed about the system of the organization of the National Guard, which is organized in all federal states. Its command is thus in the Pentagon, which is responsible to the President and Congress, but it also has local commands deployed in all the states. At the head of all those commands in the states there is a general-adjutant, who is subordinated to the governor of a state. That is how the National Guard is organized in peace, while in war all the commands are directly subordinated to the U.S. Army Command.

**National Guard**

[Galic] On the occasion of that visit were you offered any kind of cooperation, at least regarding the Home Guard?

[Miljavac] They have suggested the existing form of cooperation, where one of the American federal states becomes a state-mentor to countries that are present or future "Partnership for Peace" members. Thus we were told that the federal state of Minnesota would be our state-mentor. There will thus be concrete opportunities for cooperation in education, obtaining equipment, construction of infrastructure, and so on. As early as in April we expect the arrival of the commander of the National Guard so that we can continue to discuss our future cooperation.

[Galic] During your visit to the United States Minister Susak expressed Croatia's interest in purchasing one such simulation training center.

[Miljavac] It was not only about the purchase of a simulation center. That is only one computer simulation system. We have seen two of them. One of them is for joint training, and the other for an armored personnel carrier drill. Meanwhile, it is not enough simply to purchase equipment. One has to have the people who are able to work with the programs adjusted to our circumstances. That system simulates everything, as well as the area in which the drill takes place, so you cannot move your unit across some mountain or some hardly passable ground because it simply cannot work. The American experts were giving us assurances that operating those systems is not such a big problem. Once we make a decision on what we want, and when that help finally starts coming in, they are willing to send not only their equipment, but also experts to help us out until our people make themselves masters of the technique. Maybe that is one of the first opportunities for purchase, perhaps even before any other kind of system.

The advantage of that system is in the possibility of checking the complete command. You have your task, which you solve on a map, and your decisions are fed into a computer. On the other side, there is another team working on a counterdecision, and there is practically a battle going on. On your screen you have both the number and the deployment of your tanks, and you can also ask for airplane and helicopter support. Your "enemy" has the same opportunity to redeploy his forces and maneuver with them. Everything is exceptionally realistic. Thus, if you forget about your logistic support, you lose your battle immediately, or

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if your tanks are out of range, and you open fire, there is no effect. Everything is registered. In that way, you relatively quickly drill both a commander and command, and you can check it immediately. On the other hand, it is much cheaper. One military exercise of a armor-mechanized brigade means several million dollars' expense. However, with this system, all this costs $100,000.

**Western Organization**

[Galic] The Croatian delegation has also held concrete talks concerning admission into the "Partnership for Peace."

[Miljavac] Secretary Perry said definitely that he would support our requests regarding admission into "Partnership for Peace" and that he would talk to the allies and ask for their support. Nevertheless, I want to make it clear that the problem of entering "Partnership for Peace" is not conditioned only by our will or by somebody's support. There are many other things. Among other things, there is the solution of the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that means that it is also linked with the implementation of the Dayton agreements. Of course, it is also linked with how to resolve the problem of occupied Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube River basin]. Both processes are connected, and they cannot be observed separately, so the speed in resolving them will determine our approximation toward "Partnership for Peace." But that is only one of the components of that process. The second important component is that we—although we have created an army that has made the world wonder, and which is a respectable force—have to reorganize that army in order for it to become compatible with the Western defense systems. In other words, we must create a system that will, if there are requests for some of our units to accomplish a certain task within the alliance, enable our unit to adapt itself to that system and become a part of it very easily. That means that we must have compatible communications, control, and command systems, as well as compatible principles, both in education and in decisionmaking, and, of course, in equipment. So that is one process that has started, first as a political decision, and then in its realization. The speed of it will depend on our capability of quick response to the requests and reorganization.

[Galic] In order to achieve compatibility with the NATO forces, one must purchase new weapons and educate officers. Can you tell us something more concrete about it?

[Miljavac] We have several programs. One of them has been offered by the United States via international cooperation, and the financial funds to carry out that program have been approved by the U.S. Congress. That program was discussed even before the visit of our delegation to the Pentagon, but of course during our visit, too. Within that international program, we would have a certain opportunity to school our officers at all levels. We also talked about the possibility of wider participation by our officers in education at leading American military academies like West Point.

[Galic] A group of six Croatian candidates for West Point is being mentioned.

[Miljavac] Yes, that is correct, but you must know that those candidates have to be prepared very well in order to meet the standards without which one cannot get into the leading military academies. There is also a possibility of schooling at the certain levels in their command staff schools. I must point out that two officers of ours have already been attending school in Garmisch Partenkirchen at the local Marshal Center.

[Galic] Have you discussed any possibility that American military professors and instructors might come to Croatia?

[Miljavac] The general public knows that we in Croatia already have members of MPRI [Military Professional Resources, Inc.] who are retired officers and noncommissioned U.S. Army officers and who have founded a professional company to help with the organization of armies in the democratic countries in transition. Two years ago our minister personally requested that the U.S. Government and U.S. Defense Department help us with a faster reorganization of the Croatian Army in order to enter "Partnership for Peace." The U.S. Defense Department recommended the company, which includes officers who commanded the U.S. Army at the time of Operation Desert Storm, and who retired a year or two ago or even only a couple of months ago. They are here now, and they are observing the situation in order to find the appropriate way to structure the Croatian Army in line with our economic and demographic abilities, but also according to the environment in which we find ourselves, which in fact means the shaping of our army for the future.

**Weekend Exercises**

[Galic] Of how much interest can the American experiences in the organization of armed forces be to us? Let us take, for instance, their National Guard.

[Miljavac] One of the purposes of the National Guard is to give support to the U.S. Army's professional units so that at the moment National Guard members make up 30 percent or so of the American forces in IFOR [Implementation Force]. It is interesting to note that the pilots flying the American aircraft patrolling the "no-fly" zone above Bosnia-Herzegovina have mostly been

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National Guard pilots. They also flew the cargo planes in the airlift to Sarajevo. So they are people who, when they enter the National Guard, voluntarily spend one weekend every month on a military exercise, and as many as two weeks during the summer months. The National Guard has all three aspects, the coast guard, the air force, and the ground forces. Their units can be used in natural disasters or larger riots, when they serve as a kind of police force. They also fight against narcotics, smoking, and alcohol, and there they mostly work with youth.

[Galic] Our general public has the decided opinion that it is mostly veterans who join the National Guard.

[Miljavac] After a longer period of service in the active army, because of their experience, professional officers have been appointed to the main command and organization positions. Civilian education has been used as well. For example, a civilian traffic engineer or manager of a transport company is simultaneously the head of the transport department in a National Guard unit. It is interesting to point out that they pass through the same method of education as the professionals in the U.S. Army, the only difference being in the norms, which are not as high, nor is the intensity of the training so high.

[Galic] Could our Home Guard be organized according to that model in the near future?

[Miljavac] Nothing can be copied from the original. Every country has its specific qualities. However, the method of organization itself, the cooperation, and possibly the concrete help is certainly welcome, and we will use that.

[Galic] The Croatian Army has a peacetime organization now and by that is meant the Home Guard, too. How do you intend to maintain the combat ability of the reserves, now that it has been completely demobilized?

[Miljavac] Surely in some regions of Croatia we have perhaps had even an overly exaggerated reserve component. In order to maintain the normal functioning of a state, it is known what percentage of the able-bodied conscripts can be involved in the units. In the world it is usually up to 8 percent. In places we have had even 30 to 40 percent. That was our reality because we were creating military units then, at least for a certain period of time, when we had weapons. We had to do so because of the force that had turned against us. Surely today, when we are in a period of peace, we will structure that reserve component so that it meets those criteria in the future. That means that it should be structured both according to the economic strength and demographic structure of the country, and at the same time that it can answer all the challenges. We will reduce the reserves, and we will take younger people and thus gain in quality and raise the combat strength of those units. Regarding the training, all those people have spent a year or more in combat, so in the near future there will not be a great need for intensive training, but it is certain that we will be checking and maintaining the level of combat readiness. Therefore, we will plan that every year at least one battalion from a reserve brigade is subjected to a test of combat readiness. If we notice that combat readiness in some unit has worsened, we would certainly react immediately, and call it up more frequently.

**Disciplinary Measure**

[Galic] One Croatian weekly recently published that you yourself were in charge when General Vrbanac was found guilty.

[Miljavac] I was not in charge. I am the president of the military-disciplinary court of the Croatian Army General Staff, by the decision of the minister of defense. According to that, by order of the chief of staff, the investigation into the entire event was carried out, and all the documents delivered to the disciplinary court martial. On the basis of those documents the military-disciplinary measure vetoing promotion, which lasts a year and a half, was passed on Gen. Vrbanac.

[Galic] Was Gen. Vrbanac afterwards returned to the office of the chief of the General Staff Operational Department?

[Miljavac] Gen. Vrbanac has not been returned to that office, but is now at the disposal of the Personnel Department.

**[Box 1, p 2]**

**William Perry's Toast to Minister Susak: Victory in War**

My friend and colleague, Minister Susak, emigrated to Canada, built a successful career, and returned to Croatia in order to help his homeland reach freedom.

The 26th President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, once said: "He who deserves credit is the one in the arena, whose face is smeared with sweat, dust, and blood; the one who fights like a hero; the one who roams and always returns, who has great enthusiasm, who is faithful, who gives himself to valuable goals, who, if he falls, falls daringly and defiantly, so that his place will never be with cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat."

Of course, the place of Minister Susak will never be with those cold and timid souls. He has been in the "arena,"

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he has fought like a hero, with his face smeared with sweat, blood, and dust. He has won the victory in a war. The hardest test is in front of him—to build a lasting peace.

At the end of the American revolution, a great patriot, Thomas Paine, said: "It was in our power to start our world anew." Croatia is facing the challenge of the beginning of and building a new life. It must have courage to wipe out old prejudices and accept new dreams.

As the Croatian nation struggles to recover from war, to start anew, and to build a new life for their people, the United States supports your endeavors to banish old prejudices and make your dreams come true. And we expect the day when a strong and independent Croatia will join the world's associations for peace, freedom, and prosperity.

Elie Weisel said: "Men must remember that peace is not God's gift to their posterity, but our gift to one another."

**Croatia: Tudjman Receives German Parliament Delegation**

*LD0903200896 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The delegation of the Foreign affairs Committee of the German Federal Parliament headed by its president, Dr. Karl-Heinz Hornheus, is visiting Zagreb. Tonight they were received by President Franjo Tudjman. Our crew with our colleague Zeljko Rajic were at the Presidential Palace.

[Rajic] Germany has been and still is Croatia's greatest friend, a fact proved in the last five years. This meeting will only contribute to the development of multilateral relations between Croatia and Germany. And it is the development of good relations that will help Croatia's entry into the European integrational processes.

The inevitable issue was Bosnia-Herzegovina, precisely the realization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. President Tudjman explained the reasons of the crisis and repeated the significance of the peace agreement and the influence of Germany on its implementation. In short, a meeting that once again confirmed the good relations. That is all from the Presidential Palace.

**Croatia: Trial of Alleged Spies Opens in Zagreb**

*LD1103182496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The trial of 18 persons charged with criminal acts of spying opened today at the Zagreb military court. The three main defendants—who are on the run—Mihailo Knezevic, Mirko Vuletic, and Mile Kosanovic are accused of having organized and led an intelligence service in the Republic of Croatia for the benefit of a foreign country and organization, that is, for the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They committed the act during the war and during direct danger of war.

The remaining 15 are accused of having joined this intelligence service and gathered information for it also during the war and direct war danger.

They are Nikola Ivancevic, Mile Cika, Dusan Tarbuk, Ivica Perner, Jovan Vuckovic, Milan Supica, Savo Tepsa, Radovan Jovic, Niko Drakulic, Irena Predovic, Dusan Dulikravic, Vojin Mrzic, Djordje Vrcelja, Ilija Vrcelja, and Rajko Bedic.

After all the proposals had been set forward and the Court council had decided on them, the trial continued with reading the charges. The trial at the Zagreb Military court continues.

**Croatia: Objections to Leasing Ploce to Bosnia Federation**

*LD1103224896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting was held in Ploce today attended by the Dubrovnik-Neretva deputy prefect, Luka Siljeg, representatives of the port of Ploce and of the Ploce port trade union and town and municipal officials from the Neretva valley to discuss the draft contract on implementing the agreement guaranteeing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation access to the Adriatic Sea over the territory of the Republic of Croatia. The mayors of Ploce and Metkovic and the town leaders of Opuzen, Slivno and Kula Norinska described the draft proposal as unacceptable and drew attention to the damage it would inflict on both the town and port of Ploce, the Neretva valley, and Dubrovnik-Neretva county.

It was stated in the conclusions adopted at the meeting that the provision to lease a part of the Ploce port to the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation for 99 years and the provisions that could upset the political and demographic balance in the lower Neretva region are particularly unacceptable.

**Croatia: E. Slavonian Serb Official Views UN Contacts**

*AU1103160896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbs in this region are interested in diplomatic and other activities to find the best solution for the future of the Srem-[Serb name for Srijem] Baranja district. This is the main reason behind

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today's interview with Slobodan Milovac, deputy chairman of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly, by Petko Koprivica.

[Koprivica] Mr. Milovac, over the past two months you have had many meetings with the representatives of the international community and leading officials of the Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem [UNTAES]. What is your impression of those meetings and their position on the future of the Srem-Baranja district?

[Milovac] First of all, I would like to thank you for your visit and take this opportunity, as today is International Women's Day, to send my best wishes to all the ladies of the Srem-Baranja district, especially the mothers and wives of dead soldiers. May their future bring them much happiness and health.

As for your question, let me say the following. Our meetings and cooperation with international institutions and representatives of the international community have so far mostly dealt with economic problems. As regards political matters, we have talked about them and reached a certain level of agreement, i.e. so far we have signed the Erdut agreement, which is the basic agreement on the Srem-Baranja district. Very often it is indisputable that we recognize international institutions, i.e. the UN administration. [sentence as heard] Everything else is unacceptable to us.

The second part mostly deals with the economic future, although we cannot separate the political from the economic; a strong and developed economy will, of course, be reflected on the political scene as well.

[Koprivica] International diplomatic circles say that the Serb side, after signing the Erdut agreement and after Dayton and Paris, was more than willing to cooperate. Does that mean that this will also apply to the cooperation with UNTAES regarding the implementation of the Erdut agreement?

[Milovac] Yes. At every moment we provide assistance to the representatives of the United Nations, especially regarding the talks and implementation of the Erdut agreement. We are serious about implementing, together with other nations living in the region, what was signed by the representatives of this nation. I cannot say that those measures are logical, but, regardless of how unacceptable some parts of the agreement may seem to us, others provide certain advantages that we should use. These advantages are especially evident in Articles 7, 8, and 9, which deal with the settlement of the region. Every time we contact UN representatives, we emphasize our willingness to cooperate and we practice what we preach. However, we also expect serious and correct treatment in the implementation of the Erdut agreement.

[Koprivica] A program for rebuilding and consolidating the economy will be very important for the future of the region, but we need foreign capital to carry it out. Some promises have already been made to that end. Could you elaborate on that?

[Milovac] You are right about that. Allow me again to make a reference to Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Erdut agreement, which are our main requirement. I repeat: We must settle these areas. The settlement is under way and very intensively so. I believe that we will very soon realize our dream and settle the region. Such a realization calls for a serious approach by every individual, i.e. not only municipal institutions and officials, but every individual in the neighborhood community. No official or representative of an institution can implement it without the support of the people.

Economic matters are closely related to that. We should follow the example of Japan, Korea, Singapore, etc. What is wrong with them? In other words, countries with strong economies also have political strength. We should, therefore, all start working seriously to that end, regardless of whether we have the flow of capital or not. We must use our own reserves—and I believe we have them—to reach a certain level of economic stability without expecting help from abroad. We have had contacts and talks with the international community and representatives of the FRY. So far, we have been given promises by the international community that certain funding has been allocated for the revitalization of the economy of the Srem-Baranja district. I hope that the UN representatives will show that they are serious and determined about that part as well. Unless our plans are carried out, all those meetings and talks are [word indistinct]. However, I think they have realized that we mean business, that we are a serious side. We believe they are. I think that implementation will be completed and that we will see the final economic effects.

### Croatia: Official Attitude Toward Returning Serbs

*AU1203083996*

[FBIS Summary] Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 7 March carries during its regular 25-minute newscast a 10-minute commentary on the attitude of the Croatian authorities toward the issue of the return of refugee Serbs.

The announcer begins by reporting Ambassador Galbraith's statement on the need for Croatian authorities to accelerate the process of issuing the documents necessary for Serbs to return. He goes on to say that "the

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future of nearly 400,000 Serbs who had to leave Croatia during the war has to be addressed very soon. Many of them, particularly those who became refugees in August of last year, during the Croatian aggression against the Republic of Serb Krajina, have expressed the wish to return. The international community and the United States will have to move more efficiently in order to change the present Croatian position."

The announcer continues: "This position does not, at least for the time being, allow for any major Serb repatriation, and the legal system has been so adjusted. From the very start it prevents any attempt by a Serb to get the necessary Croatian documents, primarily the certificate of citizenship, the famed 'domovnica.' The absence of an abolition law and a wide spectrum of administrative and legal tricks, are only part of the systematic measures that Croatia is taking to prevent the return of the Serbs. According to the published information, only several hundred displaced Serbs have returned to Croatia in the past several months, all of them with family in Croatia or married to Croatians. All the others who have attempted to return found the swing gate at the Croatian border down. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, which organized the collection of applications for return, reported at one time that over 25,000 applications for return to the Krajina had been delivered to the Croatian authorities through the U. S. Embassy. According to official information from Croatian institutions, only about 2,000 applications have been accepted—a negligible figure that should be a cause for concern for all the international mediators in the resolution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

"At the same time the heavy anti-Serb propaganda continues in Croatia. The party in power is making it impossible for Serbs to return to even the smallest towns and villages, and is publicly criticizing all those who support it. The best example of this policy are the frequent Croatian Democratic Community demands that the government commissioner for Knin—(?Petar) Pasic, who is a Serb—be replaced. The (?pro-regime) SLOBODNA DALMACIJA regretfully establishes that while the struggle for power in the town is under way, the refugee Serbs are gradually returning."

Adding that other media are "also reporting on the danger of the Serbs returning," and that the representatives of the Serb National Party pointed out that if certain proposed bills are adopted by the Croatian Parliament there will be "additional legal protection against the return of Serbs," the announcer says that "the few who have returned have no chance of getting any kind of job; there is no room for Serbs in the state administration or education, which are practically the only spheres of activity that function in the Krajina municipalities, and which employ mostly Croats who commute to their jobs from the cities—Split, Zadar, Sisak, Karlovac, and Zagreb."

Moreover, the announcer adds that "Galbraith's warning is probably not unfounded—he used to be absolutely inclined toward Croatia—and it is to be assumed that this is an announcement of a specific action on the part of the United States concerning the return of the refugees to Croatia."

**Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Demand 'a Just Peace'**

*AU1103134996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The people of Darda and the whole of Baranja are determined that disputes with the Croatian side will be resolved in a peaceful way both during transitional period and after the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mandate. It is better to negotiate for years than wage war for a day, and Baranja is not in favor of war but of a just peace and consistent implementation of the Erdut Agreement.

The provisions of the agreement, the historical facts about the Serb territory in (?what is at present) the Srijem-Baranja province, the decisions of the multiparty [word indistinct] of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly dated July 1991 about Baranja remaining in Yugoslavia, as well as the decision of the Great Assembly of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem about separating from Croatia are firm evidence of this territory's regional independence. Croatia may manipulate these irrefutable facts as much as it likes, but the Serb people and members of other ethnic communities who fought the Ustashas together will never again live under the Ustasha insignia.

This was emphasized at last night's public forum in Darda, which was attended by soldiers, citizens, representatives of the Association of Soldiers of Baranja—[name indistinct], Mirko Stupar, [name indistinct], and Milos Kupresanin—and, on behalf of the municipal authorities, president Vaso Zigic and head of the municipal administration Miroslav Mikic.

The soldiers from Darda made Darda and Baranja very proud of their performance in the victorious battles against the Ustasha forces; they speak with reverence of the young people who gave their lives for this freedom, and care for the families of the soldiers who were killed, but they will also continue to be the vanguard of all those who will unselfishly carry out the peacetime tasks.

They will soon determine the number of the available housing units and the amount of uncultivated agricul-

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tural land, and they will also present the needs companies have for highly qualified personnel. The aim of these activities is to have even more Serb refugees from the western parts of the Krajina settle and integrate in the Darda area, which is well known for the excellent way it has accommodated refugees.

The soldiers demanded that firm measures be taken to revitalize the economy and protect human rights and personal property in combatting crime and all other deviant behavior.

**Croatia: Serb Radio on Refugee Serbs in E. Slavonia**

*AU1103133696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Provided that economic activity is revived and housing facilities secured, it will be possible for several thousand more refugee Serbs to settle in the Baranja area within a very short period. The results of the settlement program are very good: 2,614 Serbs expelled from Lika, Banija, and Kordun have been accommodated in this area from 1 January to 1 March this year.

Fifty or more refugees a day are acquiring refugee status in Baranja, which indicates that there is great interest in settlement and permanent integration in the everyday life of Beli Manastir municipality.

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**FYROM: Tosevski: No New Proposal on Name**

*AU1103214196 Skopje MIC in English 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The mediator in the Greek-Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] dispute, Cyrus Vance, did not submit any kind of proposal for any name version," Ambassador Ivan Tosevski, negotiator in the Greek-Macedonian negotiations that are being held in New York with the mediation of the United Nations, told the Macedonian press on Saturday.

Thereby, Ambassador Tosevski refuted the Greek Government spokesman who stated last week that at the negotiations in New York, mediator Vance had proposed the name "New Macedonia" for the Republic of Macedonia.

The only conclusion from the last meeting on February 27 was to meet again with Greek ambassador Zaharakis and mediator Vance in the second half of April. He emphasized that in this phase of negotiations, neither the Greek, nor the Macedonian side are placed in a situation to contemplate on any kind of alternative or name proposal.

Mediator Cyrus Vance suggested the name "New Macedonia" back in May 1993, in preparing the draft-agreement which was never signed, as it was not accepted by either side.

**FYROM: DPS To Aim for Federation With FRY**

*AU1103211896 Skopje MIC in English 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Permanently linking the fate of the Serbian people in the regions of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] with the common life of the Macedonians and other nationalities living in these regions, the Democratic Party of the Serbs [DPS] in Macedonia will engage all democratic means to resolve the constitutional position of the Serbian nation in Macedonia." This is the main conclusion reached at the First Congress of the DPS, at which, beside the adoption of the congress documents, Dragisa Miletic was re-elected party president, as the only candidate. After the playing of the party anthem "Boze pravda," Dragisa Miletic submitted a report on the party's activities in front of the 156 participants.

Accusing a part of the authorities, he drew attention to the "truly unfavorable position of the Serbs in Macedonia," saying that "in the last 55 years, the Serbs are a peoples without language, voice or religion," adding that "only the Serbs are not in the Constitution, only the Serbs do not have their own theater financed by the state, their own newspaper, cultural society, music festival, the laws of their church are not supported by the Ministry of Culture, and they do not have the right to choose the editorial staff of the Television program 'Vidik' on the Macedonian Television." Furthermore, the "Serbs are not in Parliament, the Government, the highest forums of the state bodies and the local self-government..."

Miletic underlined that the "basic principle of the party is to have nothing less and nothing more than the other national groups in Macedonia." Among its adopted program activities for the upcoming period, the party set forth some strategic goals, such as controlling at least a part of the legislative and executive power, as well as the protection of the national identity of the Serbs in Macedonia, with education in the native language, the formation of church communities and the clear explication of the problems in front of the public, the authorities and internationalization of the endangered Serbian national essence.

On a political plan, the party will strive for an "independent Republic of Macedonia as a part of FR Yugoslavia, as a single economic system."

Stressing in its congressional conclusions that the DPS is for peace and that any attempts to resolve open questions through armed conflict, uprisings or conflict situations and disorder, are unacceptable, the newly-elected chief council is instructed to initiate the restoration of the talks with government officials, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and other factors, for the resolution of all controversial questions with which "the Serbs would become equal with the other nationalities living in Macedonia."

**FYROM: Article Analyzes Balkan Politics**

*AU1203121796 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Mar 96 p 13*

[Commentary by Tomislav Ivanovski: "The Balkans Without 'Apple of Discord'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recent visit of Bulgarian Prime Minister Videnov to Belgrade prompted some Serbian historians to remind their people that Saint Sava was a friend of Bulgarian Czar Ivan Asen, that he spent the last days of his life at the Bulgarian Court, where he died in 1235, and that Czar Dusan's mother and wife were Bulgarian princesses! The occasion was taken to say that it is time to emphasize the "brighter side" of the history of Serbian-Bulgarian relations beside the "painful moments" and to open a new chapter in cooperation between the new FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia [FRY] and Bulgaria. This new time, according to Serbian historians, was created with the formation of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of

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Macedonia—FYROM] as an independent state. They say that this has finally removed the "key" precondition for causing and deepening mutual misunderstandings, which served as reasons for a number of wars and warring conflicts between the two sides in the past.

For now, it remains unclear why it was necessary to go back to the Middle Ages to emphasize the importance of a state visit between two neighbors. However, before and after Videnov's visit, Belgrade's public opinion was bombarded with ideas for intensification of cooperation, for opening the Serbian-Bulgarian border, for the creation of a free trade zone, for an all-European development of Balkan policy, and even for a kind of a Schengen arrangement in the Balkans. At this time, Sofia accepts all these thoughts and ideas with less euphoria than Belgrade, although it can be noticed that numerous delegations are crossing the border almost daily in both directions. We must not forget that during the strongest blockade against the FRY, FRY Prime Minister Kontic visited Bulgaria, as did all the leaders of the Serbian part of Bosnia, including Karadzic.

So, there are no problems with the Sofia establishment—now that the SFRY [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia] no longer exists and that Macedonia is now an independent state—or its wish to develop more intensive relations with Belgrade. Sofia accepts this recognition, which was only presented in the views of some Serbian historians, without giving any scientific and historical comments, for two reasons. First, it probably knows that Macedonia's independence is due to be recognized by Belgrade. This eliminates Bulgarian fears of a possible reconstruction of a new Yu-federation, not because it is concerned about our fate, but because it is afraid of Serbia's (Yugoslavia's) expansion to the south again. Second, because Bulgarian historians, since the times of Zhivkov [former communist leader], and therefore before the Serbian historians, have been developing a thesis that all Serbian-Bulgarian disputes and wars in the past are due to the quarrels about Macedonia.

In any case, the illusions from the past that have nourished the Macedonian neighborhood's appetites and pretensions toward our state reaffirm the fact that independent and sovereign Macedonia is a factor of peace and stability in this region of the Balkans and in the whole region of southeast Europe as well. This political position, which was promoted by Gligorov just after the proclamation of independence and is promoted in Europe and the world by Macedonian diplomacy on every occasion, was initially faced with rejection, and even mockery, by some of the neighboring countries, but also by some of our own false patriots and "defenders of the national cause." The first to realize the importance of independent Macedonia was the United States, which immediately made it clear to all that the territories of the new state in the Balkans cannot be a subject of bargain any more, that they cannot be annexed and that the United States will not allow this to happen. Europe and the European Union became aware of the importance of what we here call the "oasis of peace" only after the ignition of war in the territories of former Yugoslavia. Only then did it become clear how valuable and important it was for the European continent that Macedonia had gained its independence peacefully, that the former Yugoslav Army had left in peace, that no neighbor had been involved—no matter how willing some of them were—that Macedonia had not associated itself with any of the neighbors, because if it had, it would have meant opening old wounds and appetites and that could have deformed the new balance in the Balkans.

It now seems that this determination of Macedonian foreign policy not only promoted our independence and secured the borders for the protection of the national and state interests, but it also helped the others find their place in the newly created reality in the Balkans. In simple words, the former "apple of discord," as European politicians and historians used to call Macedonia in the past, is now gone because now there is the Republic of Macedonia, and since there are no reasons for further disputes and divisions, it is possible to start the construction of a new all-Balkan policy. All this is incorporated in the latest determination of the European Union for the intensification of cooperation of the countries in the Balkan region, as a course that will ease their inclusion in the already established relations of the European Union and the western world, quite unburdened by old hatred, misunderstandings, and traumas, for solving, by the end of 20th century, everything that they have left unsolved in history.

The Balkans, however, would not have been the Balkans if the rapid rapprochement between Belgrade and Sofia, even without the "apple of discord," had not caused various commentaries and suspicions, particularly because there are loud rumors about a cooling of FRY-Greece relations. As an explanation, they say in Belgrade that there are not any eternal friendships and enemies in politics, but only interests! This is probably what now makes some of Belgrade's strategists speak of the importance of Burgas [Bulgaria] Harbor on the Black Sea and about its links with the Harbor of Bar on the Adriatic. On the other hand, this manifests the great Serbian dissatisfaction after Athens had refused to let a new free Yugoslav zone be restored in Thessaloniki, as well as after the Greek Government had declined to abolish visas for Yugoslav citizens. Ultimately, Belgrade was insulted by Athens when Athens remained loyal to the European 15 after it had been suggested to bargain over

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the name of Macedonia when the FRY announced its recognition.

The crown of all these new Balkan events was found in the Athens weekly EPENDHITIS, which wrote that Major and Rifkind [UK prime minister and defense minister] had allegedly promised Milosevic British arms of $5 billion and strong British support in the European Union if it formed a kind of a Yugoslav federation together with Macedonia. According to the weekly, this new state could protect British interests in the region and prevent German expansion to the south.

This article, to which neither London nor Belgrade have reacted yet, is considered by some circles in Athens as a malicious reply to the Serbian adultery and the British veto during the adoption of the EU document on the Greek-Turkish dispute, after which Turkey was not condemned although Greece had insisted on it. However, regardless of whether it was just ordinary malice, concealment, or a game behind the curtains, the current developments in the Balkans are promoting regroupings of the local "forces," searching for new political geography in the region, and they definitely herald the fact that Belgrade, Sofia, and Athens are trying to gain domination or leadership. It is obvious that even without the "apple of discord" the Balkan nations will succeed in finding opportunities for conflict and for breeding mistrust.

### FYROM: Commentary Urges Political Responsibility

*AU1203113796 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Mar 96 p 13*

[Commentary by Erol Rizaov: "Forgotten Lesson From History"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Astute polemics will be conducted for years in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] on whether the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and its leaders crossed the line of democratic rules and constitutional frameworks in bolstering power or whether it was just a normal democratic act, compatible with multiparty systems.

The supporters of the Liberals will generally accept their removal from power, only one year after the election coalition's formation, as a kind of an overthrow, as a violent and arrogant capturing of power, as a booting out from the "common house" of the Alliance for Macedonia, and they will long be searching for political, economic, and personal motives.

As for the Social Democrats and their fans, the formation of the new government without the Liberals and with a parliamentary democratic vote represents a big step in the further development of democracy, a date that will be marked in the SDSM's party history as a resolute "no" to imposed compromise and limits in its party's identification and energy.

The strength of the conflict between the two parties, which claim to be the largest parties and the main actors in the political life and authority in the state, clearly announces permanent clashes and showdowns, creating an illusion that the number of their affiliates and supporters is growing daily. Of course, it all depends on the political and personal inclinations of the citizens, and probably there will be others who will make their decision, or have already decided, depending on their specific interests, once for one side and other times for the other side. This is absolutely normal, and it is in the framework of the democratic struggle to win power.

Many others who had believed in the preelection promises and compactness of the Alliance for Macedonia will not remain indifferent to this fact because they think that they have been cheated and manipulated, losing confidence in the politicians and the policy for which they voted. This is again an integral part of political life. It is natural for the nonparliamentarian political parties, which boycotted the last elections, to see a chance for themselves in this situation.

The interparty relations and turmoil on the Macedonian political scene could be simplified in this manner for now. These theses can be accepted only if we float on the surface of the events that are usually served from the aspect of party interests, because it is precisely the party activists who are giving "further explanations" to the public.

#### Without Moral and Intellectual Challenge

Nevertheless, in order to draw a more objective picture about our political developments, what we mainly miss at this moment are different and unbiased, competent and authoritative analyses that will go deep into the roots of the causes for our political turmoil, and, what is even more important, we miss well-grounded observations that would provide a vision about the events that confront the citizens of Macedonia. There seems to be an absence, or an insufficient supply, or only a few, public statements, political and professional research or speeches by outstanding experts of the Macedonian situation who are unburdened by party considerations. There are no public speeches from political parties that are not hampered by party discipline or that share opinions that differ from their leaderships. Some escapades are more dedicated to the defense of one's own party than to objective analyses and arguments regarding their

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own positions. There is an impression that the necessary moral and intellectual challenge is lacking for a more serious analysis of the big political changes that are taking place or are being announced. Also missing is the indispensable dose of caution and anxiety, characteristic of people who are expecting a fast radicalization in the political and economic situation, new temptations for the democratic processes, or reexamination of certain fundamental democratic, strategic, political, and economic orientations.

These lines should not be taken as a roll call or as a propaganda call from the intellectuals and their political declarations and arbitration in the construction of the democratic strategy for Macedonia's future. On the contrary, these roll calls for political declarations and abuse of the intellectuals in political showdowns defile politics, and this is something that we are not immune to in these recent times of pluralism, unfortunately. This is just an attempt to indicate the indispensability and real need for more competent reactions and the participation of a broader circle of people. The awareness that we are facing a vital moment, in which we must not let the political struggle go beyond the democratic framework and lead to unpleasant consequences for the general stability of the state, has gained maturity. It has to do with maintaining the democratic achievements made hitherto and with resolute public pressure for greater democratic achievements. There is an explicit need to create an atmosphere in which the authority will really feel the great burden of the responsibility that has so far only been declaratively undertaken.

**When There Is No Democratic Tradition**

We must admit that, for the time being, the current actors in the political struggle, the party ideologists and strategists, who are not coming out with precise arguments in defining the goals and in drawing the new political map, as they say, are the most present in the mass media and in the public opinion in general. There is no open dialogue; there are no different opinions. It seems that the possibilities for different opinions are narrowed, which reinforces the impression that something significant is under way, something huge but secluded from the public eyes. The need for more diverse views and opinions is imposed not only because of the commitment for giving full information, but also for softening its [impact] because it is impossible to remove the perfidious pressure on competent and unbiased people who, unfortunately, are always labeled as communists—social democrats, or reversible liberals, bribed hesitaters, chauvinists, [and so on] up to national enemies.

In the absence of a democratic tradition, in the absence of firm legal norms—and who would implement them if there were any—everything is mixed up with a lot of emotion, passion, personal moralization, and deeply rooted dogma that a different opinion always represents a lie. When political interests are added to this, as well as the great appetites for power and money, in addition to our Balkan mentality, it is really forbidden to underestimate the danger of radicalization of political relations in the state, which can go beyond the democratic frameworks and which are not promising at all. Ultimately, we often forget that history is studied and restudied not only in order to know the past, but also to forecast the future. If we do not have this knowledge, then the lecture of history has not been learnt well. Our politicians will have to pay greater attention to history if for no other purpose then at least to see that history does not begin with them.

**FYROM: Political Aspects of Cadre Rotation**

*96BA0086D Skopje PULS in Macedonian 10 Nov 95 p 16*

[Article by Vasko Eftov: "Frowning Flowers..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Personnel rotation in the state, although of late it has been a question of a "strong" second line of appointment to the Electric Power Utility, the postal service, and the railroads, the possible hinted reconstruction of the Crvenkovski cabinet was "overturned" with the attempt on the life of President Gligorov.*

The time of the event was last Thursday, between the late afternoon and early evening hours, when the Branko Crvenkovski cabinet held an extraordinary session (qualified as thematic by Minister Djuner Ismail, the spokesman for the government), dedicated to the situation in some public enterprises. After extensive studies, according to Ismail, several resolutions were passed relative to the personnel. A new "director," Aleksandar Gestakovski, took over the management of the Makedonija post, telegraph, and telephone public enterprise; Pande Lazarov and Stojan Naumov became interim directors of the Electric Power Utility and the Macedonian Railroads, while, according to the new government decision, Bosko Stefanovski was appointed director of the Public Income Administration. These were four personnel rotations with as many inside stories.

Four months after the replacement of Kiro Sonevski (who, unfortunately, had "two wrong loves" in life: soccer and management of Macedonian soccer), the Crvenkovski office appointed Bosko Stefanovski, previously deputy director of the Industry Institute, thus assuming what is perhaps the hottest financial seat in the

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state as head of the taxation administration. Officially, Sonevski lost his position because of the poor collection of taxes which, under his management, barely reached 70 percent of the initially projected amount. The weak balance transactions (with a significant limit of the budget, of some 8 billion denars) which, in the final account, developed as the logical consequence of the manifested tax trends, perhaps for the first time faced the Crvenkovski cabinet with a defensive attitude in its relations with the Assembly's machinery. According to the two of them, Crvenkovski and Finance Minister Jane Miljovski, Stefanovski must strengthen the taxation base on a much higher level compared to the present.

In the final account, the Stefanovski's vertical cadre rotation leads to thoughts about dragging the quick dismantling of the Public Accounting Service, to be broken down into the Public Income Administration and the Industry Institute. In this process of successors of that service, it was only the firm view (or better said, the self-veto) of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, presented by Servet Avziu, the then minister without portfolio, that blocked Stefanovski from the very first step in taking over, for an indefinite period of time, the office of director of the Industry Institute. Stefanovski was unable to profit from the second opportunity to become part of the high-level policy system: he was replaced by Hari Kostov as Deputy Minister of Finance. His current position came as a surprise by the government. The more so since Stefanovski was about to implement his old idea of converting the Industry Institute into a strong clearing establishment of the state. This development of events demands a close scrutiny. To begin with, does this mean that the government backs the concept of Governor Stanoevski (who opposes the view held by Stefanovski) on strengthening the position of the banks and of the Central Bank in industrial payments in the state?

The spokesman for the government provided an interesting elaboration concerning the cadre act in the postal area. According to Ismail, during the interim management provided by Risto Kostovski, the quality of relations with the government improved in the public enterprise, in addition to which he was able to increase an intensification of investment activities and improve communications with international financiers. Briefly stated, according to Ismail, Kostovski provided conditions for the government to undertake the solution of the problem of appointing the head of the enterprise, supporting the view of the need to profit from the activities of assembly deputy Aleksandar Gestakovski in the administrative council of that public enterprise, and his appointment as director. In any case, there was the (un)expected arrival of Gestakovski as the head "postman" in the country (although his nomination to that position was made after last year's elections), since only a few days previously high government officials from the Social Democratic Party had categorically stated that an agreement had been reached on his appointment as director of the Roads SIZ [Self-Governing Enterprise].

Last Thursday, Kole Spasovski and Pance Kovacev were asked to pack up their briefcases. The former had lasted only two years whereas the second, a great deal longer. Actually, the end of Spasovski became clear the moment Jovan Andonov-Regan left the political stage. In any case, Spasovski will be remembered as the person who replaced the powerful Mito Markovski as director of the Electric Power Utility, after he capitulated from the attacks of mounted by said Andov and because of the unresolved issues concerning the organizer of the strikes at the Bitola REK [Republic Electric Power Combine] (at that time the director was Pande Lazarov] which only hastened his "retirement." There are two variants of the resolution of the cadre issue in the electric power system. According to the first, Pande Lazarov will be kept while the title of interim preceding his job would be dropped. This is explained by his closeness to high government officials (at the time that the new cabinet headed by Crvenkovski was formed Lazarov was a regular visitor of government offices). On the other hand, according to the second variant, Lazarov had to provide conditions for the government to handle the issue of appointing a head of the Electric Power Utility (according to Ismail), profiting from the opportunity of having former Minister of the Economy Petrus Stefanov in its administrative council. By itself, this means that the Social Democrats were abandoning an important area to the benefit of the Liberals. The question is what is the compensation for such a "sacrifice of a pawn"?

Pance Kovacev was replaced, according to the explanation of Minister Ismail because of the requirement of updating the activities on the east-west corridor and the process of economic improvement of the enterprise that, along with the electric power system, was the only one among the public enterprises to be in the list of the greatest losers in the state. Unofficially, Kovacev is charged (is this justified?) with the erroneous steps taken on the basis of the achieved agreement, according to which the Pelagonija Construction Enterprise would be given the right to build the railroad tracks to the Bulgarian border. Subsequently, Pelagonija reached an agreement with an Austrian company to participate in the overall completion of the tunnel deal. Mention was made of the possibility of dividing this enterprise into three sections.

Therefore, the personnel turnover has applied only to the second line (the possible reconstruction of the cabinet

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was prevented by the attempt on the life of Gligorov). This, despite the fact that, in this specific case, it is a question of a "strong" second team. In the next few years, the electric power system, the postal system, and the railroads will require the use of many millions of dollars, after the expected governmental resolution on strengthening the infrastructure in loan relations with international financiers. The possibility of a measured rate and quality of such transactions guarantees the increased opportunity to influence the formulation of an economic policy. In this case, pure pragmatism is implied, not counting the fact that the averaging of the tax area (Stefanovski must choose among the Italian, French, and German models in rating the tax harshness), in addition to the ambitions of the Minister of Finance on intensified control over the work of the customs can only further strengthen the position of the member of the government in charge of controlling this area.

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**Poland: U.S. General on PFP, Polish Armed Forces**

*WS1103144296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Mar 96 p 4*

[Interview with U.S. General Richard Austin by Pawel Wronski; place and date not given: "With No Distrust"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Major General Richard Austin, 47, is chief of the National Guard of the State of Illinois. He is the U.S. coordinator of cooperation with Poland within the Partnership for Peace program. During a visit he paid to our country last week, he held many talks at the Ministry of National Defense, among others with General Tadesz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff.*

[Wronski] A recent report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service states that U.S. generals are afraid to convey confidential information to officers from East European countries with a communist background.

[Austin] That is not true. There is no distrust on our side.

[Wronski] Do you trust Polish generals?

[Austin] General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, recently visited the United States. I did not see anything being hidden from him. Also, lower-ranking Polish officers spoke to our officers and experts. From what I saw, they were even surprised by our openness.

[Wronski] Do you encounter the same type of openness on the Polish side?

[Austin] General George Jouwlan, chief of NATO's Allied Command Europe, who is in charge of the Bosnian operation, told me recently that Poland is the most open to cooperation of the 13 states within the Partnership for Peace program. For you, Partnership for Peace is a road toward NATO, an opportunity of adapting your Armed Forces to meet Western standards. We want to assist Poland in that process.

[Wronski] What specifically is the United States offering the Polish Armed Forces?

[Austin] In 1997 Polish troops will take part in exercises with one of the U.S. divisions. We are also offering linguistic training. The Poles could learn English or other languages in our country. We also want to introduce our program of training noncommissioned officers. In the United States, professional noncommissioned officers are the backbone of the Armed Forces. Sergeants, not officers, train men and have ongoing contact with them.

[Wronski] Have you suggested a program for training generals?

[Austin] (Laughter) Not yet, but that is no problem.

[Wronski] Why is the State of Illinois overseeing Polish participation in the Partnership for Peace program?

[Austin] Illinois, with the city of Chicago, is the state that is most densely populated by people of Polish extraction. This is a very powerful group, which maintains close ties to its homeland.

[Wronski] Have Poles ever been under your command during your military career?

[Austin] Yes. They are very good soldiers, just like the Americans.

**Poland: Interview With Former Counterintelligence Chief**

*WS0803112796 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 24-25 Feb 96 pp 10-13*

[Interview with Colonel Konstanty Miodowicz, former chief of counterintelligence at the Polish Office of State Protection, by Agnieszka Kublik, Edward Krzemien, and Bartosz Weglarczyk; place and date not given: "I Felt Good in the Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The CIA does not hide the fact that it makes use of journalists. The KGB made use of the press by passing appropriate instructions to newspapers infiltrated by its agents. The Office of State Protection [UOP] believes, however, that, if these circles were infiltrated by agents, there would be great risk of scandal, which irresponsible politicians could exploit to their advantage, Konstanty Miodowicz, former chief of UOP counterintelligence, has said.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Prime Minister Cimoszewicz was very critical of the secret service in his expose.

[Miodowicz] It is unfortunate that none of the prime ministers could get the government to formulate the long- and short-term goals for UOP in a consistent rather than incidental fashion. I might add that every prime minister had practically unrestricted access to UOP materials. Sad to say, it was beneath the dignity of [former] Prime Minister Olszewski to study operational documents, to cite just one example. Even when advised by [then Interior] Minister Macierewicz, he did not take the trouble to look into them.

I myself suggested presenting the prime minister and the minister of justice with a list of organizations classified as extremist under UOP surveillance. I wanted to verify our classification and receive their approval. All in vain. As a matter of fact, a situation in which the service clamors for a definition of its duties is, in itself, quite

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intriguing. One would rather expect the service to fight for the greatest leeway.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Have politicians no conceptual framework for the work of the secret service?

[Miodowicz] That is true. It follows from talks with politicians who have made public statements about the secret service that their knowledge of the subject is, in fact, suprisingly scant.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How would you assess the concept of closer UOP supervision by parliament?

[Miodowicz] As a positive idea. The control systems are well developed. UOP is controlled by the Inspectorate of the Interior Ministry, by fiscal control authorities, the Supreme Chamber of Control, and, to a considerable degree, by the prosecutor general. This system of control is further complemented by the existence of a special Sejm commission.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] recently made claims that in 1991-94 both you and [former Interior] Minister Milczanowski had excluded some counterintelligence operations from the control of operational means conducted by the UOP Control and Supervision Inspectorate. Does this have anything to do with any operations directed against political groups or the media?

[Miodowicz] Nothing of the sort. My impression is that counterintelligence was the UOP division that came under greatest control. The issue surely has to do with materials related to some very important operations that were accessible only to the head of the inspectorate, and, in a few instances, only to the minister of the interior himself. If anybody in the SLD has any doubts, the new minister, Mr. Siemiatkowski, can check to see which issues were excluded and fell within the scope of special control measures. I can assure you that they were related solely to the tracing of foreign espionage.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You were one of a small group of Solidarity people who took over control of the former Security Service [SB] and played a role in establishing UOP. Today, both you and most of your colleagues have already left the service.

[Miodowicz] I would not overestimate the significance of the departure of those who started work in the service after 1989. The service should be viewed as a whole; not the backgrounds of its officers are important but their dedication to the interests of an independent and democratic state. Let me add that over 50 percent of those employed in UOP counterintelligence services joined after 1990.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What sort of people are they? Where did they come from?

[Miodowicz] Most are graduates straight from university. A prospective officer must have a college education.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Was there any recruitment through advertising in the press?

[Miodowicz] Recruitment for UOP services was conducted discreetly. Heads of various units, such as myself at the time, relayed what their staff needs were in terms of people with specific qualifications and personality traits. These requests were then addressed by the UOP personnel department.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What sort of personality traits are required for intelligence and counterintelligence services?

[Miodowicz] You have to be perceptive, persistent, loyal toward your superiors, unafraid of being self-reliant, and, at the same time, capable of working on a large team.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Has there been a change in the secret services? Do we have services loyal toward the new, democratic Poland instead of clandestine police state secret services? Can people working in counterintelligence be trusted? Are they apolitical?

[Miodowicz] The staff is made up of highly qualified professionals, who, as a whole, are loyal toward the state and adhere to the principle of apoliticism. Democratic Poland can count on them.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Would you say the same of the top management? What about Wiktor Fonfara, the UOP Investigation Board director, the negative protagonist of the Kuron-Modzelewski letter [conciliatory letter of two opposition parliament members in reference to the Oleksy case]?

[Miodowicz] People change. Captain Fonfara, who at one time carried out activities directed against Mr. Modzelewski on instruction from his superiors in the SB has since undergone a significant process of evolution.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Is it possible these people will revert to what they did in the 1960's and 1970's—that is, will fall in line with the postcommunists or any other political option that takes over and makes such a demand?

[Miodowicz] UOP has been inscribed in the mechanisms regulating the functioning of the enitire state administration. It is possible that some unfavorable changes may take place, just as in any other part of

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state administration. UOP is a particularly sensitive institution, and its politicizing will lead to a deep crisis in the service.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You said that 50 percent of the counterintelligence staff are new people—that is, 50 percent must be old employees. Would you say with a clear conscience that all have gone through a character change?

[Miodowicz] I did not study the personalities of my subordinate officers. I judged them, especially in difficult situations, by their behavior. It raised no doubts in most cases. On the contrary, it commanded respect or even admiration.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Do they have a different sort of approach to what they do? Are they in any way different?

[Miodowicz] Of course they are different: They have far greater operational experience than those who joined the service after 1990. They were able to, and more importantly wanted to, impart this experience to us.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] One of the former deputy ministers of interior said that, without the help and dedication of the present Deputy Minister Andrzej Anklewicz, it would have been impossible to complete the verification of 20,000 employees in remote offices in such a short time frame. In light of the ambiguous role he is now playing, can his past actions be trusted?

[Miodowicz] During the verification process within the SB secret police, I was engaged in developing the concept and groundwork for establishing new units of the secret service: the Analysis and Information Office. I observed the verification process "from the side."

In a sense, Mr. Anklewicz ought to automatically receive negative verification. After all, he was an officer entrusted with the greatest confidence by top SB management, serving as a liason between the SB and the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. I do, however, know from members of the verification committee that he offered abundant information regarding those who had been his colleagues up until that time, information that was not only plentiful but also detailed. The spiteful have said he wished to ensure a place for himself in the new security forces. Since the commission did not delve into any business deals, let us say that Mr. Anklewicz got what he fairly earned.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] UOP needed him at the time. Can we have any certainty tomorrow that he will not sell his new suzerains information about the people who joined UOP after 1990?

[Miodowicz] I am not a psychologist, and my contacts with Mr. Anklewicz were very sporadic. Despite these reservations, I would say he is a pragmatic man—that is, very flexible, inclined to be on good terms with any political force that happens to be in power.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You mentioned loyalty as a trait when we asked you about the personality of a characteristic counterintelligence officer.

[Miodowicz] Anklewicz never served as a counterintelligence officer, either in the SB or UOP.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] We have heard opinions that, during verification, people favorably inclined toward the process of transformation, professionals who know specialist counterintelligence techniques, were discharged from the SB—and that these were intentional measures on the part of opponents of change.

[Miodowicz] Let us not exaggerate. The reductions in technical staff corresponded in size to reductions in operational staff. I do not deny that verification was carried out quickly, using means that might have raised controversy, especially in regional units where individuals who might have served with merit in UOP may have been forced out. At the same time, some individuals who should not have been approved were admitted into the service. That was the price for the realization of this gigantic scheme for which the Sejm set such a short time frame.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Why did you leave the counterintelligence service?

[Miodowicz] The charges the SLD had leveled against me had gone too far. I reasoned that further steps would be taken to destabilize my position in UOP. I could assume these actions would take the form of harassment in units subordinated to me. Yet counterintelligence services are too precious and, at the same time, human resources too scant for the staff to engage in a hopeless battle for their chief. To avoid leading the SLD into temptation, I decided to leave. In addition to that, the [presidential] elections, I believe, tipped the fragile balance of power. The state apparatus has become dominated by a political group that does not inspire trust, is saturated with people breeding all sorts of threats to the security of the state. I will admit frankly that I was hesitant whether it was possible to remain loyal to state authorities that had been dominated by communists. A security officer quits when such indecision takes hold.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You said that you trust your officers. You have quit. What about them? Were they not as perplexed and full of doubts as you were?

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[Miodowicz] There is only one single head of counterintelligence of the Republic of Poland. The person in that position is in a special situation. I did not abandon the service. I left it for the good of the service. The departure of other officers from counterintelligence would have been an unnecessary, empty, and irresponsible gesture.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What do you mean by saying that the ruling political party threatens the security of the state?

[Miodowicz] There are many people from the former PZPR who joined the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] and whose relationship with the structures of the former USSR, including its special services, ought to arouse the interest of counterintelligence.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] ??? [as published]

[Miodowicz] Many of them must surely be banquet lovers, enthusiasts of hunting parties with Russian friends whose ties to intelligence services are likely. Besides that, there are people there who increased their personal fortunes or the assets of the party by overstepping, disregarding, or even violating the law. Mr. Sekula is not an exception in this regard.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You have said that counterintelligence ought to investigate the connections between Russian agents and politicians from the former PZPR. Does that mean they were agents?

[Miodowicz] Counterintelligence ought to verify potential threats. Nobody falls into despair when suspicions are dispelled.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Are postcommunists the object of interest of counterintelligence?

[Miodowicz] None of the political parties on the parliamentary scene, including the SdRP, are the object of interest of counterintelligence.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Do you suspect some people may be passing on information to foreign agents and that you cannot trace them?

[Miodowicz] We can, if we have a solid basis for initiating procedural action. Counterintelligence is interested in the activities of foreign intelligence services on our territory and obtains information about the work of their agents in the course of its investigative activities. It does not, however, "go after" agents of foreign intelligence services by investigating domestic political circles.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Should that change?

[Miodowicz] That question ought to be addressed to those who decide about the tasks and form of UOP as an organization. UOP currently has no legal basis for initiating activities against nonextremist political groups.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Should it?

[Miodowicz] No, it should not.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How would you explain in this context the preparation of the celebrated instruction No. 0015, revealed in 1992 by Jaroslaw Kaczynski?

[Miodowicz] The instruction only allowed for the hiring of external consultants for the verification of studies prepared by the Bureau of Analyses and Information, a unit that processes information from open sources. Instruction No. 0015 was infamously used by politicizers and maliciously interpreted as an instrument of a procedure for procuring agents in political parties. This sort of hyperinterpretation was politically circumstantial and used for the needs of ongoing political fighting.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Did anything change after 1989 in terms of the play of foreign intelligence in Poland? Have Americans stopped spying on us, and have the Russians started?

[Miodowicz] As admitted by the spokesman for the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, Poland was recognized by Russian intelligence after 1990 to be just like any other country in Western Europe. We are operationally "attended" in the SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] by the Fourth Department, the same department that handles Germany, among other countries. This is an indirect indication of the heightened interest in our country. As recently as late January of this year, Mr. Geiger, head of the Federal Office for Safeguarding the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, expressed utmost alarm at the scale of activities maintained by Russian intelligence in Germany. Russians—the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] and the SVR—are also intensifying spying activities in Poland, including agent activities.

We also have the Belarusian Committee of State Secrity espionage and that of the Ukrainian security services—of course at a level that corresponds to their possibilities and needs.

Naturally, Poland remains within the sphere of interest of security services from West European countries and the United States. They verify Polish Government declarations in the context of our integration with NATO and the European Union. I wish to emphasize that, in the case of the Western intelligence services, we observe no aggressive activities. Information is generally obtained through means that do not violate our legal regulations.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Don't they recruit agents?

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[Miodowicz] They confine themselves to making inquiries and collecting information, to analyzing information from the media, to maintaining partner contacts with the structures of the Interior and Defense Ministries.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What about such facts as elsewhere revealed in Europe, in France, for example, of agressive business intelligence operations conducted by the CIA? Do Americans maintain such activities in Poland?

[Miodowicz] I would like to live to see the day when Americans begin to drain high-technology information from Poland. I will no longer have to worry about the future of our economy.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What about the negotiation with Western companies of contracts worth enormous sums of money? Does foreign intelligence—for instance, American intelligence services—get involved?

[Miodowicz] The CIA and other Western services have a large array of means at their disposal for obtaining information their governments need. These means do not necessarily require involving agents.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] There has been a rumor that to counterbalance the Oleksy affair that the SLD wants to reveal the identity of a high Polish Army officer who is or was a CIA agent.

[Miodowicz] I know nothing about it. I do not comment on rumors. It is true, however, that such a situation is theoretically possible, just as it was possible for the American Pollard to work for Israeli intelligence. And, mind you, it was a case that involved two countries on friendly terms with each other. I am speaking of general tendencies, not speculating whether it is possible or not.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How many foreign intelligence services are there operating in Poland?

[Miodowicz] All of the superpowers, all countries that have interests in our country, whether economic or political, collect information in our country.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Are there any Chinese or Indian intelligence in Poland?

[Miodowicz] Yes.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Has anything similar to what happened in Russia occurred in Poland—where Zimbabwian intelligence was discovered?

[Miodowicz] I have never come across such an exotic case.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What do you think about the story published by Evans and Novak in THE WASHINGTON POST, who, in the context of the Oleksy affair, claim that Russian intelligence is destabilizing the political situation in East Europe? Similar suggestions have recently been published by the Czech press, which has cited a report of Czech counterintelligence.

[Miodowicz] The statements made by Evans and Novak may have their source in a large-scale operation dating back to the late 1980's and early 1990's undertaken by the administrative section of the CPSU Central Committe and the KGB. This operation had to do with the transfer of enormous CPSU funds to West Europe. This was accompanied by the creation of a commercial base controlled by security forces on former Soviet Union territory.

This gave Soviet, and later Russian, intelligence certain possibilities for stimulating the political and economic situation in Central Europe, and partly in Westn Europe.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] A few years ago, the U.S. journalist Tad Szulc published a sensational article about the Russian intelligence service and the intelligence of other fomer socialist countries establishing a commercial structure with $25 billion in capital. GAZETA WYBORCZA reprinted the story, though we treated it as political fiction rather than anything else.

[Miodowicz] And you should continue to treat it as such.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Did counterintelligence observe any such events unfolding on Polish territory?

[Miodowicz] Central Europe is becoming one of the priorities for the Russian intelligence services. The political disinformation and political action services of the former KGB, now concentrated in the MS SVR board [as published] headed by Vladimir Nanov, most probably have a lot to busy themselves with in Poland.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What are the Russian security services interested in here?

[Miodowicz] Everything. From facts about the Polish political scene to biographical data from interviews, the processes of economic transformation, relations with West European countries, and also the perspective of the process of military and economic integration. Our military potential and the dislocation of Army units and state security services is of acute interest to them.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What is your estimate as to the number of officers of the former KGB currently operating in Poland?

[Miodowicz] Resident officers in diplomatic missions have very considerable operational experience gained through work in very difficult conditions in West

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Europe. They have an excellent ability to assess the realities of our country. Espionage is also conducted through unconvential means in the guise of business activity.

There are several dozen officers actively carrying out tasks in Poland for the secret services of the Russian Federation.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How do we know?

[Miodowicz] These are estimates based on counterintelligence observation.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Is it true that a large number of Russian agents working in Poland come to Poland from the West pretending to be Western journalists or businessmen?

[Miodowicz] We have observed such situations.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Do you warn people who are contacted by Russian officers that they are foreign intelligence agents?

[Miodowicz] It does happen that, as in the case of Mr. Oleksy, counterintelligence warns citizens that they are in a relationship inspired by foreign security services.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Can I rely on counterintelligence to warn me when I want to meet some Western journalist that I am contacting an agent?

[Miodowicz] That is highly probable if counterintelligence believes that through you your interlocutor may be carrying out activities that threaten the security of the state. We do not interfere when the activities of foreign intelligence are not aggressive—that is, focus on collecting open information or maKING inquiries—and are not part of a plan designed to obtain an agent.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What about people in top government positions who frequently meet diplomats? Do you warn them that, among the diplomats, Mr. X, Y and Z are agents?

[Miodowicz] We do.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Do they receive a list of sorts?

[Miodowicz] Such information is offered to people whose contacts with representatives of foreign intelligence services go beyond very formal contacts—that is, spill over into their social life.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] In that case, why wasn't Oleksy notified earlier who Alganov was?

[Miodowicz] Mr. Oleksy was informed at the appropriate moment that Alganov was an officer of a foreign intelligence service.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] But only as late as September 1994, though they had known each other for a much longer time.

[Miodowicz] We did not have appropriate information earlier. The information was offered to Mr. Oleksy as soon as it was possible to do so in a responsible way.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What else does the counterintelligence service do?

[Miodowicz] It currently has six primary tasks: the protection of our territory against unacceptable activity of foreign intelligence services—that is, classic counterintelligence; the protection of state secrets; the surveillance of people and structures connected with international terrorism, particularly those from the Near and Middle East; the surveillance and control of extremist groups and prevention of their activities. However, there is a criterion that is very rigorously used in our operational work: An extremist group is one that declares the use of violence, along with violation of the law and Constitution, to achieve certain political or social goals.

By the way, such threats come mainly from ultraright groups, which pose, if not a real then at least a potential threat to state security. It is enough to imagine what would happen if such a group became clandestine. Without prior surveillance, we would lose the possibility of reaching organizations using terrorist methods.

Other tasks of the counterintelligence service include actions aimed at the protection of the state's interests and economic security and, finally, the surveillance and neutralization of organized criminal groups that are particularly dangerous to the state, particularly those with international connections.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] That is the mob?

[Miodowicz] This could be tagged so, if one wants to boil the matter down to a slogan. In particular, this relates to the production of synthetic drugs or the smuggling of natural drugs via our country. This is a problem that will grow. In this regard, the Polish market has not yet developed. It will develop, as the situation stabilizes and the population's living standards increase.

Let us also list counterfeiting of money and documents, shipments of fissionable materials, large-scale smuggling of consumer and industrial goods, smuggling of people.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Why is this under the jurisdiction of the counterintelligence service and not the police?

[Miodowicz] Special services supplement police activities. Police work is burdened very much by the

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need to carry out immediate and current tasks. On the other hand, we have experience in conducting long-term surveillance and strategic espionage of these structures. Plus, we have very efficient operational and technical units.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Are there any problems with recruiting secret collaborators for the counterintelligence service? The former SB would win over collaborators by blackmail and money and would search for "dirt" on them. Have these methods changed?

[Miodowicz] The methods of winning over collaborators are often above all systems. Currently, too, incriminating materials can become a springboard to win over a collaborator. Nevertheless, we think that cooperation is more efficient if there are positive motives.

UOP's possibilities of winning over collaborators are tightly connected with political events, particularly with the emergence of concepts of vetting in various periods. As for President Kwasniewski's Chancellery's recent idea to disclose a part of the network of agents run by the counterintelligence service before 1995, I must say that it has had a negative impact on UOP's collaborators and has been negatively assessed by our partners from Western services. This idea undermines the position of UOP as a responsible partner in international cooperation.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Do you think this proposal was a result of unawareness of such consequences or intentional?

[Miodowicz] I do not think the Presidential Chancellery's activities were intentional. They were supposed to become something agitating and diverting the media's attention from the problem represented by [former Prime Minister] Oleksy.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Was the point not deliberate destruction of agents?

[Miodowicz] Let us not exaggerate. I expected that the Chancellery would later give up this insane idea, and this actually happened. At the same time, we were being offered another strange idea: the possibility of clarifying accusations of cooperation with foreign intelligence services against Polish citizens by a vetting body. In normal states, it is prosecutor offices and courts that clarify such accusations.

The whole idea of establishing some Malachowski institute is a big mistake. I would remind you that Germany's Gauck Institute [contains files of former Stasi collaborators] has been drained of the majority of operational files of the former GDR Ministry of Security.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Drained by whom?

[Miodowicz] By competent state services.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You want to say that what has been withdrawn are the most interesting things...

[Miodowicz] ...and the most dangerous ones. I think the materials the Federal Office of Constitutional Protection mentioned a year ago and that concern about 300 cases of cooperation between FRG state officials and the KGB prior to [German] unification are not available from the Gauck Institute. This fact allows us to presume that many qualified operational files have been removed from the bulk of materials the Gauck Institute had at its disposal.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What is the situation with corruption? Is it possible to somehow assess its scale? What portion of the ruling elite is corrupt?

[Miodowicz] It would be very risky to assess corruption among state administration officials in percent because, by their nature, the revealed cases of corruption are merely the tip of the iceberg. Both corrupt people and those who corrupt them are interested in keeping what took place between them secret. And it usually happens in this way.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] But UOP has methods of collecting information that later cannot be used as evidence in court.

[Miodowicz] UOP indeed has information according to which it is possible to assess the scale of this phenomenon.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Does UOP monitor public auctions in which foreign firms participate?

[Miodowicz] Foreign firms can promote their interests through corruption. There was the case in Lodz, about which the press reported, on the board of a tobacco company. UOP becomes interested in auctions only if it is officially requested to do so. Much more often, however, state officials are corrupted by people from Polish firms, companies, or holdings.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Is corruption a widespread phenomenon among higher authorities in Poland?

[Miodowicz] No.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Which elite is more prone to it—Solidarity or the postcommunists?

[Miodowicz] I would not run the risk of making such divisions. Although the ruling teams changed in Poland after 1989, the core of the official apparatus has functioned regardless of political changes.

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[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] A few years ago, the Swedish concern Eriksson signed an agreement on deliveries of radiotelephones for special services. One of the then deputy prime ministers, not being very sober, said that he had to accept a bribe because he was about to vacate his office and would have no more such opportunities.

[Miodowicz] I think I do not have to comment on the statement by the drunk minister (was he alone?). The contract with Eriksson was analyzed by different structures from various ministries. It was accompanied by controversies to the end. I do not know at what level they were resolved.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How many cases of corruption, of which you are sure, occurred during the past four to five years?

[Miodowicz] During the 1991-95 period, UOP actively investigated several serious cases of corruption or, more precisely, suspected corruption.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How many of these cases ended with trials in courts?

[Miodowicz] Very few.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Boguslaw Bagsik has just returned to the country. The case of the Art-B company is returning with him. Do you think the company accumulated such enormous wealth during such a short period of time in accordance with the law?

[Miodowicz] The Art-B owners very skillfully used loopholes in the law and possibilities of multiplying capital, taking advantage of the shortcomings of the Polish banking system.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Have rumors about the Art-B's contacts with foreign organizations, the mob, and KGB been confirmed?

[Miodowicz] Perhaps they have, though the counterintelligence service does not know of such confirmation.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Why did UOP fail to prevent Bagsik and Gasiorowski from leaving the country?

[Miodowicz] UOP knew very well when and from where Bagsik and Gasiorowski wanted to leave Poland. It did not manage to obtain a prosecutor's warrant before their departure, though.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Were they warned about an expected arrest?

[Miodowicz] I do not rule out such a possibility.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] The chief of Art-B's bodyguards at the time claimed that he knew about a search planned by UOP at the company's palace in Pecice.

[Miodowicz] UOP has cooperated and is still cooperating with many state institutions. In this case, it cooperated with law enforcement agencies. All the accusations of leaks against UOP are beginning to annoy me. UOP is the last organization I would suspect of this.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] There is talk, however, that the dismissal of UOP Chief General Gromoslaw Czempinski, which is currently being considered, was prompted by the fact that he was unable to check the leaks concerning the so-called Oleksy case from UOP.

[Miodowicz] I presume that information about the so-called Oleksy case was divulged when materials drafted by UOP's operational units were taken over by political circles.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How many people knew about the Oleksy case in Poland?

[Miodowicz] UOP has a rule according to which only those who have to be informed about something are informed about it.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Is there anybody outside UOP who knows as much about this case as the UOP officers responsible for it?

[Miodowicz] No, there is no such individual.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Does the Prosecutor's Office know less than UOP?

[Miodowicz] UOP officers know about facts that are insignificant to the case and were learned on the sidelines of the main goal of the operation. I do not know if it is important for the Prosecutor's Office whether the observed object smokes this or that brand of cigarettes. But it can be significant for an operational officer.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Has the press published more true or false information about the Oleksy case? Have journalists been deliberately misinformed, or have they been merely dishonest?

[Miodowicz] I cannot say that journalists have been deliberately misinformed. However, facts concerning the case that have leaked to the public have naturally been blended with suppositions. And some of these journalistic reconstructions have crossed the limits of probability and plunged into absurdity.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Perhaps this has been done intentionally?

[Miodowicz] No, not quite. Similar events took place in 1993, for example, when the counterintelligence service investigated the case of a Pole who was an agent of Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU. It was

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impossible to fully inform the press at that time, and it will be impossible to do so in the course of the next few years.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You claim that there are no leaks from UOP. However, a UOP officer who took away certain documents from the office and handed them over to someone else was recently arrested.

[Miodowicz] No, I do not claim this. "Leaks" from UOP, however, are individual and separate cases, though they have very unpleasant consequences for the office.

In this regard, I will draw attention to the scandalous "leaks of information" to the NIE weekly. People involved in delivering secret materials to this weekly have been located and exposed.

One may only regret that they still foul the service's personnel.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Are they the same people who informed Urban's weekly about alleged surveillance of Kwasniewski's headquarters by UOP during the presidential campaign?

[Miodowicz] Perhaps. I think, however, that the myth about the surveillance of the SLD, which had nothing to do with the facts, was conjured up by the SdRP. It was rather an instrumental myth, which could used during the election campaign. It was very convenient, appealed to the electorate's emotional associations, and provided an argument for personnel reshuffles in the Interior Ministry in case of a victory and, at the same time, would explain a possible defeat.

Returning to the case of the recently arrested UOP officer, however, the information he carried away did not concern the so-called Oleksy case, I believe.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] RZECZPOSPOLITA wrote that some businessman received this information.

[Miodowicz] RZECZPOSPOLITA is usually well informed about matters about which it writes.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Does the case of this officer testify to the fact that there are corruption cases in UOP?

[Miodowicz] UOP is not a lonely island but an integral part of the state apparatus. One can only applaud the fact that the phenomenon of corruption has affected the law enforcement and judicial bodies on such a small scale.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] At least three former SB officers wrote and stated in interviews for TRYBUNA that the spying charges against Oleksy are absurd because in the 1980's the KGB and the GRU did not conduct espionage in Poland and did not have secret intelligence agents.

[Miodowicz] I do not share these opinions. Even in the period of the Polish People's Republic [PRL], the Russian intelligence service kept Poland under surveillance by secret intelligence means (that is, through secret intelligence agents—editorial remark). The GRU had Marek Zielinski as its intelligence agent, who was recruited to cooperate with the foreign intelligence service in the early 1980's.

I will give another example. In 1961, Michal Goleniewski, one of the chiefs of the SB First Department—that is, the intelligence department—fled Poland. Following this, he put Americans on the track of George Blake, one of the most spectacular KGB agents in the British intelligence service. Goleniewski came into possession of this information due to the fact that, among other things, he himself was a KGB agent in the Polish SB structure and, under instructions from the Russians, had to organize cover and protection for Blake.

The KGB routinely protected facilities and higher tactical units of the Soviet Army in Poland by networks of informers performing not only counterintelligence, but also intelligence functions. In a similar way, the KGB protected strategic communication routes along the East-West axis that traversed our country.

I can quote more examples of secret intelligence infiltration of the PZPR structures and the PRL state apparatus. This phenomenon was intensified in the situation of a "counterrevolution threat" after August 1980.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] I would like to return once more to disinformation. If the service subordinated to you conducts a delicate operation and if its bumbling may jeopardize many people, would you resort to broaching disinformation to the media in the form of a leak?

[Miodowicz] Many counterintelligence actions are developed as protective measures, including disinformation. This applies to creating mock targets that absorb the attention and operational effort of foreign services. Disinformation is generally organized by one's own secret agent networks.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Do the Polish services use such fake leaks, too?

[Miodowicz] The counterintelligence service intentionally has not conducted any operations to inspire the Polish press.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Does UOP have its trusted people among Polish journalists? [Interior] Minister Siemiatkowski asserts that it does.

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[Miodowicz] Mr. Siemiatkowski said on one occasion that he was terrified by a preliminary review of UOP's materials regarding secret service involvement in journalistic circles. Several days later, when interrogated by the Sejm Commission on Administration and Internal Affairs, he tried to deny this statement. Therefore, the question should be directed not to me but to Mr. Siemiatkowski in order to give him the third occasion—third time lucky—to express his opinion about this issue and to decide which of his statements corresponds to the truth.

Conducting extensive secret service investments in journalistic circles is doomed to end in failure. Full control over journalists is a task beyond UOP's possibilities and needs; in addition, it would contradict the spirit of the law on UOP.

A UOP agent, placed, for example, in GAZETA WYBORCZA, is not able to destabilize the information market in Poland and manipulate public opinion. This is an absurd idea in a situation where there are many press publications that, by their essence, are in a certain opposition to UOP.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Do you not think that UOP, if it succeeded in getting in touch with a GAZETA WYBORCZA journalist, would be able in this way to influence the publication of materials advantageous to UOP and the nonpublication of unfavorable ones? Or, through its informer, to look for leaks from UOP?

[Miodowicz] I will repeat that UOP has not invested in people connected with the media.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] In your opinion, was this a correct decision?

[Miodowicz] This matter was thrust on UOP—and rightfully so—by the law and executive practice formulated by the interior ministers. The counterintelligence service believes that, in the event of uncovering a secret agent in the media, the entire UOP would be seriously injured.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] This means that UOP is an exception among the world's special services, which employ journalists as secret coworkers. This is being done, for example, by the CIA.

[Miodowicz] The CIA really uses journalists and does not make any secret of this. Many journalists openly keep contacts with the Agency. The KGB, in turn, used the press not in a partnerlike way, but by issuing appropriate instructions to editorial offices connected to the KGB by secret intelligence ties.

UOP has not been able to find many people among journalists who could openly cooperate with it. At the same time, UOP believes that constructing secret intelligence ties in this circle is fraught with the risk of a big scandal on which irresponsible politicians could feed.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] If not among the journalists, then in what other social circles does UOP recruit its agents?

[Miodowicz] In all social and professional groups that can help create the system of state security.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] The NIE weekly reported during the presidential campaign that UOP was keeping Kwasniewski's electoral staff under surveillance. The weekly published the names, ranks, and units of officers allegedly involved in the surveillance of the SLD leader's people.

[Miodowicz] I have not read NIE, I am not familiar with the articles mentioning specific persons placed in UOP. who had to keep the communist circles under surveillance during the campaign. I can assume that the people mentioned in NIE are actually placed in our service. However, I resolutely deny that any of them could perform anything contradictory to the Interior Ministry's apolitical stance.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You mentioned that NIE has informers in UOP. Do other publications have informers, too?

[Miodowicz] I mentioned a marginal and pathological case. I cannot confirm that UOP has information about documented relations of officers with other newspapers.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] You said in an interview for TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY that the SLD tried to recruit UOP officers for cooperation during the presidential campaign.

[Miodowicz] Between the first and second election rounds, politicians connected with the SLD tried to get in touch with their old contacts in the Interior Ministry to learn their opinions about Kwasniewski's election prospects.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Was this done by Jerzy Dziewulski, chief of the presidential bodyguards?

[Miodowicz] Not personally. Dziewulski is a person compromised in the eyes of UOP's entire officer staff. He is an arrogant person, who has imagined that he is also an expert in problems concerning the special services.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What did the SLD want to know about UOP?

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[Miodowicz] This was a typical reconnaissance action. It tried to sound out the opinions characteristic of UOP's officers. The point was to sound out intentions and opinions as well as to find out whether the communists may count on this service in the event they win.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Was this operation successful?

[Miodowicz] No.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Did the officers inform you that the SLD had attempted to contact them?

[Miodowicz] I was informed about an attempt to establish contacts, and their content was documented by UOP.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] In other words, taped?

[Miodowicz] I said: documented. Appropriate materials should be made available for the Sejm Commission for Special Services. Mr. Siemiatkowski was informed about these matters during a session of the commission. During the hearings preceding his appointment to the post of interior minister, he said that he did not know about this matter. I want to remind him that all interviews in the Sejm special commission are registered.

At the same time, I want to emphasize that the issue of UOP's alleged involvement in the election campaign against the SLD should be subjected to public hearings in the parliamentary forum. Assuming that UOP was actually involved in the election campaign against the SLD, I can decidedly state that this was a crime. Its disclosure could positively influence the future development of UOP.

If the publicly and officially formulated charges against UOP are not proved, I think public opinion should be made familiar with this in the same way as these charges were formulated.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] What was taking place in the counterintelligence service in 1992, when the Interior Ministry was headed by Antoni Macierewicz?

[Miodowicz] The vetting measures did not involve the counterintelligence service. For me personally, Macierewicz's time in office was a period of difficult trials and challenges because there were attempts to rid UOP of people whose professional skills and loyalty to the state were assessed very highly by me.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Did they want to perform a purge?

[Miodowicz] No significant changes took place in the counterintelligence service. However, there were attempts to provide me with a list of people for dismissal. Because I assessed their work as useful for the service and, on the other hand, did not see any possibility to obstruct these instructions—because this would be disloyal—I said I would stay in UOP provided these measures were not taken.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Who was on that list?

[Miodowicz] It was an imaginary list, since there was no document, of course. There were many officers in high posts in central and regional structures of the counterintelligence service.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Were they employed before 1989?

[Miodowicz] Not only.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] So, what was the criterion?

[Miodowicz] It was not entirely clear. It seems to me that selecting people for dismissal was based to a large extent on completely private preferences of the UOP deputy chief.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Were there attempts during Macierewicz's tenure to use the counterintelligence service for surveying political opponents?

[Miodowicz] Not at all!

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] How do you assess the years 1989-96 in your life?

[Miodowicz] I did not join UOP with some arbitrary presumptions, and I have never maintained that I know something better than others do or that I am particularly competent. I learned for a long time. I felt good in my service. I met many people who thought of state interests in similar categories.

[GAZETA SWIATECZNA] Special service officers perceive the world as one full of plots and see an agent in every man. How did you cope with this?

[Miodowicz] I think that I succeeded in maintaining the ability to see things in proper proportion and dimensions.

**Poland: Kwasniewski Expected To Visit Russia at End Apr**

*WS1203124096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Mar 96 p 2*

[Report by "DOM" under the "Poland in Brief" rubric: "Presidential Visits"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Marek Siwiec from the Presidential Chancellery informed reporters yesterday that the date of President Aleksander Kwasniewski's visit

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[to Russia] will be announced during the coming visit of Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to Poland. The Polish president is expected to visit Russia at the end of April. He is also to meet Czech President Vaclav Havel on 19 March. Siwiec said that invitations have been extended to Italian President Luigi Scalfaro and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to attend a summit of Central European presidents scheduled to take place in June in Lancut [southeast Poland].

**Poland: Contradictory Statements on Kaliningrad Corridor**

*WS1203123796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Mar 96 p 3*

[Article by Maciej Cholodowski in Bialystok: "Freedom Union Deputy and Kaliningrad Mayor on Transit Road; Uproar About the Corridor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The visits paid by the Russian ambassador to Suwalki Voivodship had to do with the expressway connecting Kaliningrad oblast with Russia," says Freedom Union [UW] Deputy Krzysztof Wolfram. The mayor of Kaliningrad, on the other hand, claims that he first heard of the whole issue only after Yeltsin and Lukashenka announced their decision.

Wolfram claims that already several months ago the Office of State Protection was disturbed by the frequent visits paid by Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev to Suwalki Voivodship, where he met with Voivode Cezary Cieslukowski. The UW deputy maintains that the visits had to do with the expressway connecting Kaliningrad oblast with Russia; an agreement on the topic was signed afterwards between the presidents of Russia and Belarus.

Meanwhile, during a news conference in Szczecin, Kaliningrad Mayor Vitaliy Shipov denied that the authorities of his oblast had ever talked to the Suwalki voivode about building a corridor bypassing the territory of Lithuania. "The authorities and inhabitants of Kaliningrad are against building such extraterritorial routes because they would deprive the city of its special status," said the mayor.

Shipov claims that talks with the authorities of the Suwalki voivodeship pertained exclusively to the modernization of existing roads that would facilitate economic contacts with voivodships farther away from the border.

**Poland: Factory Head: Agricultural Equipment Sent to Jordan**

*WS1103151896 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9-10 Mar 96 p 3*

[Article by Pawel Wronski and "JK": "Nothing Was Smuggled to Iraq? Sprayers, but for Agriculture"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Polish Aviation Plant [PZL] Director Mieczyslaw Majewski told us yesterday that in January his factory (aside from Mi-2, manufactured through a Soviet license, the factory produces Huzar combat helicopters) concluded a contract with the al-Eiman Company of Jordan; the shipment that is being questioned was in transit to this firm. The Jordanian firm was to receive spraying equipment and hydraulic elements of Mi-2 helicopters.

"We did not violate any UN sanctions," Director Majewski says. "We sent the Jordanians aviation equipment for agriculture; the final recipient was not Iraq, but Jordan."

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] confirmed that the shipment of equipment for civilian helicopters does not violate UN sanctions. MSZ Spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski added that, if Jordanian custom officers found any illegally exported spare parts, they might have been in the shipment, but outside of Poland's borders. [passage omitted]

A year ago PZL Swidnik supplied Iraq with spare parts for Mi-2 helicopters. The factory's directors claim that it had obtained approval both in the country and in the UN because the sanctions imposed on Iraq do not apply to agricultural equipment. [passage omitted]

**Poland: Deputy National Defense Minister Resigns**

*LD1203102896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0900 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy National Defense Minister Jan Kuriata has tendered his resignation and this has been accepted, said National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski in a radio interview today.

Jan Kuriata said that poor health had forced him to resign. But Minister Dobrzanski did not deny that the resignation might be linked to the earlier dismissal of Henryk Mika, head of the General Staff's military armaments and equipment department, who was a subordinate of Deputy Minister Kuriata. The dismissal of General Mika was connected with a report by NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control], which stated that there had been irregularities as regards the tendering of contracts for cross-country vehicles for the Army, the

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sale of armored BWP-2 transporters to Angola, and irregularities in trade involving ammunition.

**Poland: Council of Ministers Head on Administrative Reform**

*WS1103144196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Mar 96 p 2*

[Untitled report by "AKK" under the "Poland in Brief Rubric"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Voivodes cannot be members of opposition parties," said Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, at a conference in Szczecin yesterday. He spoke in favor of establishing 12 strong but nonautonomous voivodships, which would be further subdivided into large and economically effective powiats. Miller estimates the cost of the reform at 700 billion old zlotys.

**Poland: Integration Measures in Right Wing Viewed**

*WS1203123896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9-10 Mar 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by R.W. and M.D.Z.: "The Right Wing Would Like To Win the Parliamentary Elections; the Beginning of Preelection Maneuvers"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *As the parliamentary elections are drawing closer, the right wing is again beginning its traditional preelection maneuvers. More and more unification ideas are submitted, and all leaders declare their preparedness for cooperation, even though no one is holding official talks yet. Nonetheless, party chairmen already today declare that they want to build a camp that will win and that will be able to form a cabinet after the elections.*

**Weak and Quarreling**

The only way for the splintered anticommunist camp in Poland to get to the parliament is unification. No rightist leader conceals this; however, differences become clear when it comes to telling how to achieve this unity: through domination or by forming a coalition. Both methods were in the past tried out by some political groups, such as the Center Accord [PC] and the Christian-National Union [ZChN]. The Confederation for an Independent Poland (which is the main force in the Patriotic Camp) also failed to dominate the right side of the political scene, and so did the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms. It turned out that no right-wing party was sufficiently strong; in addition, right-wing groups were too much at odds with each other to reach agreement.

**Agreement**

Today most anticommunist groups (nearly all of them can count on obtaining only very little support in the elections) see only one obvious road to creating a strong right-wing camp: unification. "I want to help build a camp that will take over power after the parliamentary elections in Poland," declared new ZChN Chairman Marian Pilka at the news conference after the party's congress. He announced that he would hold talks with Jan Olszewski, leader of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], and with Solidarity. PC Chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who has already given up the idea of withdrawing from politics, began making preparations for the "reintegration" congress of his party and is holding talk, more or less official, with circles linked to Jan Olszewski and the Freedom Union [UW]; he does not rule out reaching an agreement with any of these groups.

**Domination**

However, both the PC and the ZChN are "former giants" that cannot count on sufficient social support at the moment. For this reason, ROP does not look upon these groups as real partners; ROP leader Jan Olszewski does not conceal that he has already decided to carry out the integration process through domination. He rejects the idea of forming a coalition and encourages regional right-wing activists to cooperate with ROP, hoping to take control of the structures of other parties. He openly suggests to his right-wing colleagues that, inasmuch as they are supported by not more than 1 or 2 percent of the voters, they are not much of a partner for ROP, which enjoys 10-percent support. Olszewski wants to achieve success in the elections on his own; only after that, if need be, will he try to find partners to cooperate with.

Among the groups that may attempt to unite the right wing through domination is Solidarity, whose leaders have not yet decided whether the trade union should run in the elections. "If not more than two blocs are set up, the union will back one of them. If, however, integration attempts fail, we will have to prepare our own electoral list in order not to fritter away the support we enjoy," Solidarity activists are saying openly.

**With Whom Will We Share Power?**

Even though right-wing leaders often say that they would like to take over power in Poland as early as next year, they realize that, even if they manage to win many seats in the Sejm, they will have to take over power from the postcommunists "jointly" with one of their parliamentary partners. The PC and a few less important parties would tend to look for a partner in the Solidarity camp, one like UW, which would admit

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to assessing the situation wrongly in the past and which would express a willingness to cooperate with the right wing. ZChN politicians, including the new chairman of the party, do not really believe that UW might "examine itself" and "really repent its sins." Although ZChN Chairman Pilka would like to meet with [UW Chairman] Leszek Balcerowicz, he does not conceal the fact that Balcerowicz is not the partner he dreamed of. Thus, the group that is receiving weak signals from the ZChN, particularly from ROP, is the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], although both rightist parties condemn the PSL for being in coalition with the Democratic Left Alliance. However, the ZChN and ROP express the hope that the "rank-and-file members of the party" will finally force the PSL leadership to turn to the right wing.

Looking at the results of public opinion polls, right-wing leaders do not tend to overestimate the political role of their parties. If they want to stress the importance of their parties, they most often refer to the intellectual potential; they try to outbi.. one another by saying that they have stronger regional structures, more city councillors and mayors. Leaders of all right-wing parties, except Jan Olszewski and Solidarity leaders, prefer not to mention the results of opinion polls. [passage omitted]

**Poland: Draft Law Seeks 51% Polish Share in Privatization**

*WS1203110296 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 9-10 Mar 96 p 1*

[Article by P.S.: "PSL Dislikes Foreign Investors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 8 March the Sejm subcommission that worked on a draft law on commercialization and privatization of state-owned companies concluded its work. As NOWA EUROPA was told by Sejm Deputy Jan Wyrowinski (Freedom Union), Jozef Lochowski (Polish Peasant Party—PSL) submitted a motion to include in the draft law a provision that says that state-owned companies could be sold only to firms in which Polish shareholders have at least a 51-percent stake. In well-justified cases, the Council of Ministers might ignore this condition. The motion was voted through with the help of PSL deputies. Jan Wyrowinski, who was against the motion, is outraged. He stresses that this provision is a "no" for foreign strategic investors, even though the country needs more of them.

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**Romania: Past, Present Actions of Iron Guard Defended**

*96P20326A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 20 Feb 96 p 2*

[Article by Zaharia Marineasa, "former political prisoner": "Reply to Stan Ionescu—Iron Guardism Versus Extremism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] United by falsehoods and denigrations, the communists, together with other cosmopolitan and occult associates, have been trying, for more than half a century, to convince the world that the Iron Guard movement is a totalitarian, violent, and antisemitic organization.

In the following lines, by the examples which will be given, these accusations will be refuted and proven to be false.

In regard to the charge of violence, in light of the most basic statistics, the response of the Iron Guard members to the violence used against them was under one percent.

In regard to the case of [historian Nicolae] Iorga and [economist Virgil] Madgearu [who were assassinated in November 1940], both the leadership of the Iron Guard movement and the other members of the Iron Guard condemned this act. The idea that this was a deed of the KGB, for the purpose of denigrating the Iron Guard, still has to be proven, in the future, by documents of foreign secret services.

In all situations, regardless of who was responsible for the violence, Iron Guard members regretted its occurrence.

I will respond to the accusation of antisemitism with the following examples: the Baraseum Jewish Theater was established in Bucharest during the four months of the Iron Guard government. No other country in Europe did such a thing during the time of the Nazi expansion. And here is another example: Raul Sorban, a Romanian citizen and an honorary citizen of the state of Israel, told us during a television broadcast that Iron Guard member Archpriest Muresan of Cluj saved two Jewish children from the Holocaust at the time of the Hungarian occupation. The terrible accusation regarding the Slaughterhouse proved to be false. The press of our days published a list of signatures of employees of the Slaughterhouse during the respective period, thus refuting this fabrication. Even the official Jewish books, which had introductions by the former chief rabbi, Moses Rosen, do not claim that there was a Slaughterhouse. The Iron Guard is blamed, unjustly, for the Jewish victims during the time of the Antonescu coup. On this occasion, columns of young unarmed pupils and students were subjected to machine-gun fire and more than 1,000 of them were killed. Not a word was said about these victims. No Iron Guard member was sentenced for having killed a Jew or a Romanian soldier, despite the official efforts which tried to make such an accusation real. More examples could be given.

The following example can be kept in mind in regard to the Iron Guard's attitude of nonviolence: It has been six years since the 1989 Revolution and Iron Guard members cannot be accused of acts of revenge against those who tortured them and killed them.

Iron Guard members are being criticized for printing and receiving books from abroad, but those who accuse them cannot say that they have found in these books incitements to violence or to the rejection of democracy. The moral validity of Iron Guard writings, in which the principles and deeds of the Iron Guard are found, cannot be denied. These books would protect the youth from extremism. Iron Guard members have not monopolized Christian and national sentiment and they will rejoice in any pure thought in this area, no matter where it might come from.

In the present judgment of time, from the spiritual point of view, the Iron Guard movement is on the right and its principles and actions relate to Christian morality. This criterion eliminates the pretense of placing us in the center. In the center is God and we can place ourselves, by our actions, either to His right or to His left. Continuing this line of thought, the extreme right, from the point of view of meaning and language, should encompass the maximum of love and goodwill. A few years ago, this "right" was called nationalism and had nothing in common with chauvinism. With every passing day, we see how, with the help of some left-wing Europeans, communist crimes are gradually being attributed to nationalism.

From the political and economic point of view, Iron Guard members are in the center, opposing dictatorships, which can led to tyranny, and also opposed to unlimited liberalism, which might lead to libertinism and anarchy. The key to this economic and political equilibrium of the Iron Guard movement is found in Christian love. The misfortunes which occurred within this framework were accidents for which the Iron Guard members expressed regret and which they owned up to and paid for.

The following attacks occurred against the Iron Guard movement during the past five years: In June 1990, it was claimed that the persons who routed the Ministry of Interior police forces were Iron Guard members. Later, efforts were made in the opposite direction, that of eliminating Iron Guard members from the history of the anticommunist struggle. But this is not possible. [Iron

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Guard leaders] Corneliu Codreanu and Ion Mota will remain in history as the most important anticommunist fighters and leaders. Other attacks came from a general and a colonel from the former Securitate. They stated, during a TV broadcast, that the communist repression in Romania was only against the Iron Guard. Iron Guard members cannot not be accused of serving Hitlerite interests since they were interned in Nazi camps: Buchenwald, Dachau, and Oranienburg.

The two officers stated, on television, that their activities were limited to the repression of Iron Guard members who were fighting against the state at that time. The Iron Guard members do not claim this merit solely for themselves. They share it with all those who participated in opposing communism: peasants, liberals, officers, persons with other political affiliations, and apolitical persons. It was not a matter of only a few thousand adversaries of commmunism but of hundreds of thousands of persons who were arrested and murdered. The two officers avoid mentioning the terrible collectivization campaign during which tens of thousands of peasants were put in prison. The bloodthirsty regime of the prisons was ignored. The slogan of those who collaborated with the communist occupiers—"Stalin and the Russian people have brought us freedom"—was forgotten. The mere expression of this base and crude phrase causes repulsion. Are there no bad opinions of those who collaborated, in word and deed, in these disasters? The country was an immense prison occupied and led by Russian communism. The real representatives of the country were those who continued to work in the mountains, in the prisons, and abroad or those who opposed the communist occupation in spirit. Let me explain that membership in the Romanian Communist Party did not always determine a person's moral attitude. The persons who collaborated by their criminal actions in oppressing and killing those who opposed the Satanization are the ones who will remain guilty.

The parachuting of Iron Guard members by the Americans in 1951-53 is connected with the accusations of the two officers of the former Securitate. Recalling the Romanian state of mind of the respective years, the curse which the Anglo-Americans deserved for Yalta was replaced by the great hope for liberation, which was expected to come from the same Anglo-Americans. Inevitably, the confidence placed in the Iron Guard members at that time is part of the hopes or dreams of our existence in history.

On this occasion, let us remember that the Iron Guard always fought against communism, considering it to be the greatest enemy of Christianity and of humanity. On all occasions, they fought alongside and associated with those who were opposed to communism (even if only sometimes).

We noted that the Iron Guard members who were parachuted into the country did not come to spy for the Americans but to organize the struggle to overthrow the communist regime, which would be connected with the conflict which was expected to be caused by the aggressiveness of communist Russia against the Western Alliance.

At the present time, Iron Guard members condemn any violent action, regardless of where it might come from. Also, they condemn conspiracy plots which might be directed against them.

Those who direct attacks against the Iron Guard movement have the obligation to rethink such a plan since Iron Guard education, in its very concept, rejects violence. Iron Guard members will give the youth incentives for peace. Violence, as a system, belongs to communism; it will be dangerous, first of all, to those who use it, either for electoral advantages or for hidden political purposes.

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## Federal

### FRY: Arrest Warrant 'Expected' Against Army Colonel

*AU1203130296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 96 p 6*

[Unattributed report: "Arrest Warrant Against Sljivancanin Soon?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sources with the Tribunal in The Hague state that soon, perhaps even next week, it can be expected that legal proceedings will be started on the basis of Article 61 of the Tribunal's Statute, which will confirm the indictment brought against Yugoslav Army Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin. He has been charged with elimination of civilians in the region of Vukovar.

If the charges, as expected, happen to be confirmed at the Tribunal's regular public session, an international arrest warrant will be issued against Sljivancanin.

### FRY: Foreign Minister Comments on 'Useful' Zagreb Visit

*LD1203001196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2225 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 11 Mar (TANJUG)—After meeting Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Milan Milutinovic, foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], described his visit to Zagreb as "significant and useful."

Milutinovic said that it was agreed gradually to overcome obstacles to the full normalization of relations between the two states.

The Yugoslav foreign minister told the press that the point of departure for both sides is the significance of the normalization of Yugoslav-Croatian relations for further progress in the peace process, for peace and overall security—not only in this part of Europe.

"We agreed to approach the ultimate goal, i.e. the normalization of relations by resolving outstanding issues in a gradual and pragmatic manner," he said.

The visit to Zagreb represents the continuation of the political talks held in Belgrade and Rome, Milutinovic recalled and added that the specific results achieved indicate that a period of "intensive contacts and dialogue" has begun.

"Our joint preoccupation to overcome the obstacles to the full normalization of relations was evident once again. Our point of departure was the importance of the normalization of Yugoslav-Croatian relations for further progress in the peace process, for peace, and overall security—not only in this part of Europe. We agreed to approach the ultimate goal, i.e. the normalization of relations by resolving outstanding issues in a gradual and pragmatic manner," Milutinovic said.

"We exchanged opinions on the implementation of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and assessed that it is necessary to continue with the consistent implementation of everything agreed upon in Dayton and at the recently held Rome conference. We particularly stressed the need for equal treatment of all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the urgent engagement of international players in preparing and conducting the elections and in the renewal and reconstruction as the priority tasks," Milutinovic said.

As far as the Srem-Baranja region is concerned, we "supported the need to implement the basic agreement consistently and comprehensively and expressed our full support for and trust in the interim administrator, Jacques Klein, and his interim administration. We believe that the implementation will proceed normally, that all refugees and the population of the region will be treated on an equal footing, as envisaged by the agreement, and that this will contribute to efforts to stabilize the situation in the region as a whole," Milutinovic said.

"We talked about the issue of Prevlaka and access to sea for the Serb Republic," Milutinovic said.

"Our view is that controversial issues should be resolved in the spirit of good-neighborliness and in line with the existing agreements," he added.

"However, until the definite solution is found, in other words until the FRY and the Republic of Croatia, acting in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1038 of 15 January 1996, agree on a solution that will help to overcome their difference over Prevlaka in a peaceful way, the security system as installed by the United Nations in line with the joint declarations by the presidents of the FRY and the Republic of Croatia of 30 September and 20 October 1992 and the UN Security Council Resolution 779 of 6 October 1992 will remain in force," he said.

"We devoted particular attention to the need to speed up work on resolving the issue of the return of displaced Serbs and refugees from Western Slavonia and Krajina and of safeguards for their property rights. We spoke in favor of full guarantees of the civil and human rights of the Serbs in Croatia. The agenda also included the issue of Yugoslav citizens' property in Croatia. We outlined our stands on this issue in an aide memoire to the Croatian side," the minister said.

"We reached a number of concrete agreements: on regulating some very important open issues, specially

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in the sphere of transport. We reached an agreement on reopening the oil pipeline; on the temporary restoration of railway and air traffic; on coordinating work of the regional flight control centers in Belgrade and Zagreb; and on telecommunications links and some postal services. An agreement was reached in principle to reopen the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. The ways of enforcing the latter agreement will be outlined shortly," Milutinovic said.

"We also regard as a significant, specific result of our talks a document, signed by Minister Granic and me, under which the FRY government office in Zagreb and the Republic of Croatia government office in Belgrade should expand their powers to include consular functions such as: issuing passports and visas, protecting interests of our citizens, and of physical and legal persons, etc. These are issues of vital importance for and in the interests of citizens in both countries," he said.

"The talks were marked by a common desire to make progress in bilateral relations, by a commitment to find solutions to satisfy the interests of both sides and the interests of lasting peace and stability in our neighborhood. As you know, these issues are neither easy nor simple to resolve. Therefore, we agreed on a step-by-step approach and I can say that we succeeded in resolving some issues and in converging our views on others by using this approach," Milutinovic said.

"We also achieved some specific results that will be of immediate benefit to citizens in both countries. They constitute the basis for further progress in resolving outstanding issues," Milan Milutinovic said.

## Serbia

### Serbia: Report Views Media Coverage of 9 Mar Rally

*AU1103204896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 96 p 5*

[Unattributed report: "Reports Without Sound, Image Without Crowd"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The rally commemorating the fifth anniversary of 9 March was covered by all the Yugoslav and most of the relevant world media.

Radio-Television Serbia reported on the 9 March rally in the Dnevnik 2 prime-time newscast, using an already proven method: Republic Square was video-recorded one hour before the beginning of the rally, none of the speeches delivered were broadcast live, and there were no distance shots to see how many people took part in the rally.

The state television assessed that around 5,000 people gathered at the rally, declaring that the poor response by the citizens was the main reason the rally began with a half-hour delay.

Three Belgrade stations airing their own newscasts, namely BK Telekom, TV Politika, and NTV Studio B, provided brief information on the rally at the end of their newscasts, prior to sports news. BK Telekom carried a special edition of "Levo-Desno" broadcast and a report called "Bez reci" on the rally.

The entire event was covered live only by Radio B 92 and Radio Smederevo. Radio Belgrade 202 carried several live linkups during the rally, while Radio Belgrade announced in the central newscast, namely Vesti Dana, that the 9 March rally failed because of poor response by citizens.

The Belgrade daily press did not devote any considerable space to this event, save NASA BORBA and DNEVNI TELEGRAF, which issued special editions on the event.

POLITIKA EKSPRES carried a brief report that the rally took place, while POLITIKA and VECERNJE NOVOSTI brought out decent, shorter reports on the pages covering parties' activities. VECERNJE NOVOSTI, however, ends its report by a comment that the theories stated by the leaders present at the rally did not land on fertile soil, and that citizens could not wait for the rally to be over and left the location.

Information on the rally held at Republic Square was carried by CNN, Sky News, BBC, and Euronews, and their reports (supported by images and earlier recordings from 1991) were typically professional.

### Serbia: Sandzak Bosniaks Complain About Treatment in Army

*AU1103184696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sandzak youngsters of Bosniak nationality are waiting apprehensively for their summons for military service in the Yugoslav Army. Their army service is very dangerous for them and so their apprehension is justified, as can be confirmed by the following examples.

[Name indistinct] Prijestorak from Priboj, who was called up for army service in December 1995, is awaiting his third operation in Belgrade. The real truth is not known about this youngster's injuries. His father demanded to treat him himself, but the army authorities did not allow it. The real truth about the case is being kept secret. The son of Sacir Jusic, also from Priboj, is

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refusing to return to the Yugoslav Army, because the way he was treated there was extremely improper. The youngster was mistreated several times. There are plenty of such and similar cases, confirmation that Bosniaks' service in the Serbian Army represents a great risk for them, the Muslim National Council of Sandzak for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declares.

**Serbia: Sandzak Muslim Leader Ugljanin Interviewed**

*AU1203100196 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 9*

[Interview with Sulejman Ugljanin, president of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, by Azra Terzic in Zagreb; date not given: "I Am Going Back to Novi Pazar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the MNV [Muslim National Council] of Sandzak, Sulejman Ugljanin (43), has been living outside of Sandzak and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for two and a half years now, ever since Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic issued an arrest warrant against him and a part of the leadership of the MNV of Sandzak. Since that time Ugljanin has mostly lived in the capital of Turkey, Ankara, where the MNV of Sandzak has its strongest branch among emigres. He gave us this interview in Zagreb, on his way back to Ankara after his recent visit to Sarajevo, which lasted several weeks, and where in his talks with all relevant Bosniak politicians he expressed his wish that Bosnia-Herzegovina more strongly support in international organizations the political struggle of the inhabitants of Sandzak for political autonomy.

**Colonial Plan**

[Ugljanin] Two and a half years ago, as I was in The Hague, I found out that policemen had come to my house with Milosevic's arrest warrant. I could not go back to Sandzak. Harun Hadzic, the vice president of the MNV and the president of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] for Montenegro, had not been warned in time, so he was arrested, along with 20 other people from the leadership of the SDA and the MNV of Sandzak. Milosevic's plan was to arrest the complete political leadership of Sandzak, or to extort a change of our policy. However, that plan of Milosevic's did not succeed, and new people appeared immediately, and in the meantime they have organized another 14 Muslim national institutions in Sandzak. After Dayton, Milosevic will have to change his policy toward Sandzak.

[Terzic] Are you coming back to Sandzak for that reason?

[Ugljanin] Hopefully soon. That will happen after our council has prepared the ground. Until now I have not gone back because it has been evaluated that Milosevic could use that to provoke an incident in which he could kill some more of our people. Until now the Serbian regime has killed 250 of our people, having taken them out of their houses, buses, trains. They either disappeared without a trace, or they were taken to Bosnia-Herzegovina and killed there. In Sandzak and abroad a petition was signed demanding that I should be allowed to return freely, and that political prisoners should be released. Over 120,000 signatures were collected.

[Terzic] You asked for a delegation from Sandzak to be included in the Dayton talks?

[Ugljanin] The state leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina also asked for that, in order to solve the Croat, Serb, and Bosniak national questions globally. However, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not accept that, saying that the issue of Sandzak would be activated once the international status of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the rights of non-Serb peoples in it start to be solved. The so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will not be able to join international institutions and integrations until it resolves the status of non-Serb peoples in a satisfactory way.

**Informative Centers**

[Terzic] When it came to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, you started your organized struggle for the autonomy of Sandzak; what have you managed to achieve up to now?

[Ugljanin] Already in 1990 we formed our informative centers throughout the world, and then our first task was to stop the recruitment of Bosniaks in the war against Slovenia and Croatia. Then we formed a stable movement and brought the name of Sandzak back into international institutions and documents. The European Union and the United States, after we visited institutions in the United States four times and after my two speeches in Strasbourg in the European Parliament, have acknowledged the fact that Sandzak is an international problem that must be solved. The international public is now getting involved with the resolution of our status, and we demand a special status for Sandzak, with international guarantees. On the day that Serbia and Montenegro ask to be internationally recognized, one of the conditions will be the solution of the problem of Sandzak. Doesn't the international public treat the problem of Sandzak only on the level of minority rights?

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We do not consider ourselves to be a minority, but a part of the Bosniak people who live outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have recognized the integrity and the invariability of the borders, which means that we have consciously remained where we are, because the world said that there would be no changing of the borders. We are a distinct people of Sandzak, and the fact that during the Berlin Congress a line was drawn between Sandzak and Bosnia is another thing.

[Terzic] What sort of status do you have today as the Bosniaks of Sandzak in Serbia?

[Ugljanin] Since 27 April 1992—none! Serbs have thrown us out of the constitution, but they will have to put us back there.

**The Decision of the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina**

[Terzic] You have sent your request that the status of Bosniaks in Sandzak must be the same as the status of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to international institutions?

[Ugljanin] By all means. That is our official position, and we ask the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to promote that position of ours, and that the same arrangement be achieved for us. We have lived in that region for centuries, we are the majority population, we are politically organized, and it is in the interest of Bosnia-Herzegovina to ask the same for us that has been given to the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not know why the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina didn't accept that position on the status of Sandzak in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia even earlier. If that had been done earlier, Milosevic could have been told: You wish to take part in deciding on our territory, then you have to do the same with yours. At the end of March 1995 the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina finally adopted a declaration expressing this position about Sandzak. Now after Dayton, Bosnia has to precisely determine what the problem of Sandzak means for it. Until now we have had emotional, national, and party ties; now we request that in the next session of the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the relationship of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward the Bosniaks of Sandzak be officially defined and institutionalized.

[Terzic] In that case Bosnia-Herzegovina would find itself in the same position as, for example, Croatia did in relation to the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Ugljanin] It is in our interest to know what we can count on. We believe that that is also in the interest of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Terzic] So your final goal at present is to achieve an autonomous status within the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

[Ugljanin] It is our goal to achieve the status of autonomy, with permanent international guarantees. That is the position of the MNV, which unifies all the political parties of Sandzak: the SDA, the Party of Reformists of Sandzak, the Liberal Bosniak Organization; and in Sandzak there is also a party called the Workers' Movement Josip Broz Tito! Our minimum request is the establishment of a special status for Sandzak.

[Terzic] Not all Bosnian politicians support you in the same way and with the same intensity. The former prime minister, Haris Silajdzic, asked that the question of the Bosniaks of Sandzak be posed in the government and in the parliament, whereas Ejup Ganic, who comes from Sandzak himself, has not been that much engaged.

[Ugljanin] The former prime minister expressed a lot of interest for Sandzak, he opened that problem in Bosnia. A state that takes care of the part of its people that lives outside of its territory is worth something, it proves its statehood in that way. Further, President Alija Izetbegovic, on the occasion of signing the Washington agreement in the United States and at the time of the UN Assembly session, advocated the rights of Sandzak. And as for Ganic, he does stem from Sandzak, but so does a third of the present population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ganic has never shown a particular interest in Sandzak, I do not know why. Once, while he was in Ljubljana, he asked for some "human rights," which caused us a lot of damage, because in that way it turned out that the attitude of Bosnia-Herzegovina is that we should only be offered the fulfillment of human rights, and not autonomy. We told him that it would be better if he did not ask for anything for us, than if he only asked for respect for human rights.

**[Box, p 9]**

**Ljajic Can Speak Only in His Own Name**

[Terzic] You have been absent from Sandzak for a long time now. You were the only leader; are you still that? Rasim Ljajic, the strong man "on the spot," your former deputy, was at the political negotiations in Belgrade?

[Ugljanin] The petition that the inhabitants of Sandzak signed for my return tells everything—I am not in Sandzak physically, but I have constant contacts with our leadership in Sandzak. I coordinate their work; that is why I went to Turkey, because that is a country that requires no visas for the citizens of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As for Ljajic, it is Serbs who say that he is the strong man in Sandzak, Milosevic

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thinks that, but the strongest of those who have remained in Sandzak is Harun Hadzic, who spent two years in Serb prisons. At that time Milosevic's servants walked through Belgrade, freer than our Bosniaks in Novi Pazar! Those who served the regime were escorted and guarded by the state security, army police, and so on. We have excluded Ljajic from our movement, and in Belgrade he can talk only in his own name.

## Montenegro

### Montenegro: Justice Minister on Crime, Internal Security

*AU1203101596 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 Mar 96 pp 16-18*

[Interview with Filip Vujanovic, minister of internal affairs in the Government of Montenegro, by Seki Radoncic; place and date not given: "The Police in Montenegro Are Not Controlled by Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Radoncic] Mr. Vujanovic, the minister of justice in the federal government recently said that the criminals in the country could be seen with the naked eye. Do you agree with that statement, and what is the situation like in Montenegro?

[Vujanovic] I heard from the media about the statement of the federal minister of justice that organized crime in the country could be seen with the naked eye. I do not know if this is what the minister of justice said and if it was correctly published, but I absolutely disagree with the statement that we have organized crime. Organized crime, according to the criminological definition, implies not only firm connections between the perpetrators of criminal deeds, but also their active or passive connection with state organs, in the first place with the police and the judiciary, and it is thanks to this connection that this sort of crime exists. It is quite certain that we have no organized crime, because it is not connected with or supported by state organs, and our public has been informed about this by the publication issued by the interior ministry on activities on combating new forms of crime in Montenegro. The state policy of Montenegro is clearly oriented to fighting constantly against all sorts of crime, and it is absurd to say that any of them can have the support of the state.

[Radoncic] It can be seen with the naked eye that bribery, corruption, economic crime, and so on, have increased. How can the regime that produced this situation and induced such behavior combat all that, now that peace has been proclaimed?

[Vujanovic] The past years of sanctions under which we lived have created an ideal ambience for crime. Starting from the war in our neighborhood, high unemployment, broken ties with Interpol, the blockade of traffic of money and goods—it is hard to think of circumstances that would be more favorable for an increase of crime. From 1991 there was a trend of significant increase of crime. However, this trend decreased in 1994, when 7,478 criminal deeds were registered, which in comparison to 9,706 from 1993 is 22.09 percent less. In 1995, 8,908 criminal deeds were registered, which in comparison to 1994 is an increase of 19.12 percent. This increase is a consequence of numerous criminal deeds from the area of economic crime, particularly forbidden trade. However capital crimes have decreased—murder, grievous injuries, blackmail, provoking of general danger—which, from the aspect of general social danger, indicates positive tendencies. In relation to the total number of criminal cases in Yugoslavia, the number of criminal acts in Montenegro has been constantly decreasing: In 1990 criminal deeds in Montenegro comprised 4.8 percent of the total number, in 1991 4.7 percent, in 1992 4.2 percent, in 1993 3.7 percent, in 1994 3.3 percent. It is obvious that the state organs of Montenegro are taking all measures for the combating of crime, with what objective indicators illustrate as favorable results. This refutes your claim that it is the regime that has produced this situation and induced behavior that has increased crime. Of course, it is not good for any state to be satisfied with the crime situation, because that would result in passive behavior by its organs, so in that sense we must not express any special satisfaction, and instead we have to be maximally engaged in improving the existing situation, now under much more favorable conditions of peace in our neighborhood and the suspension of sanctions. [passage omitted]

[Radoncic] Montenegro is the first republic of the former SFRY [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia] in which three years ago there was a trial of people accused of war crimes. At that time you were the minister of justice in the Government of Montenegro. Since in our republic some people indicted for war crimes by the Hague Tribunal are moving freely, is it possible that in the foreseeable future Montenegrin policemen could arrest such people and deport them to The Hague?

[Vujanovic] Our interior ministry has not received the list of war criminals who are to be tried in The Hague, nor have we received a request for the extradition of anyone whose place of residence is on the territory of Montenegro. Therefore I do not know if any persons suspected of war crimes are moving freely in Montenegro. There is also an explicit constitutional prohibition of extradition of our citizens to another state. There is such a prohibition in the constitutional systems of other states as well, and it shows the readiness and

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the obligation of every state to try war criminals. Our state has already displayed that disposition by the trial of the war crime you have mentioned, and our attitude toward those criminal deeds can be seen in the fact that we pronounced the longest sentence possible according to our law.

[Radoncic] Now when the public knows the truth about the way the leaders of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] were treated during their arrest and investigation, do you, as the minister of justice at the time and one of the protagonists of that process, feel any responsibility, or do you at least believe that that was an unnecessary adventure of the regime?

[Vujanovic] The public knows that there were criminal proceedings against a number of SDA members, not because of their political activity according to the party program, but because of criminal activity—collecting weapons, military training, and other activities—which, in their context, are criminal deeds. [passage omitted]

[Radoncic] What is the cooperation of the Interior Ministry of Montenegro with the Interior Ministry of Serbia, Army Security, Interior Ministry of the Serbian Republic, and Federal Customs like, and when will our police be included in Interpol again?

[Vujanovic] We have qualitative cooperation with all state organs that you have mentioned, based on jurisdiction determined by law. That cooperation is not only useful but also necessary, and the Interior Ministry of Montenegro will do everything to keep it at a high level. I would exclude from this the Interior Ministry of the Serbian Republic, with which we have occasional contacts, and I expect full cooperation only after the sanctions of the international community against the Serbian Republic are lifted. After the suspension of sanctions, we established full cooperation with Interpol, and we soon expect formal confirmation of Yugoslavia's return to membership of this association, which is necessary from the aspect of the combating of crime in the international framework.

[Radoncic] In certain sections of the public, particularly after the AB revolution [antibureaucratic revolution, when Milosovic removed local leadership], there were many rumors concerning the alleged control of the Montenegrin police by official Belgrade. The "defection" of the last head of the SDB [Social Security Service] of Montenegro Bojovic, who joined the interior ministry of Serbia, contributed to that. Can you tell us what the situation in that respect was like when you came to your post, what the situation is now, and how far there is any basis to those rumors?

[Vujanovic] The rumors about control over the Montenegrin police exercised by Belgrade are absolutely groundless and highly ill-intentioned. Our interior ministry, like all ministries, actually, is controlled only by the Government of Montenegro and the Assembly of Montenegro, through mechanisms that they have for that (delegates' questions, interpellation, the vote of confidence). The former secretary of SDB Bosko Bojovic resigned from that post, which the government accepted, and his departure to the interior ministry of Serbia is his own choice and decision, and should not be speculated with. [passage omitted]

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